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ABSTENTION-A PRIMROSE PATH*
BY ANY OTHER NAME
WILBER F. PELL, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
NASMUCH AS it is not necessary to secure a concurrence in this
particular composition, and hopefully it is not a dissent, there
will be a few threshold observations of a personal nature. The
writer's first judicial exposure to one aspect of the multifaceted pro-
cedure whereby a court does not cope with the evidentiary merits of
litigation, generically referred to herein as abstention,' was the case of
Aetna State Bank v. Allheimer.2
* An avenue of apparent escape deceptively bordered by specimens of the
genus Primula Discretionata, which should only be plucked warily.
** Wilbur F. Pell, Jr. is a Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit at Chicago, Illinois. A graduate of Indiana University,
A.B., 1937, and the Harvard Law School, J.D.c.I., 1940, Judge Pell engaged in the
private practice of law in Indiana from 1940 to 1970 with the exception of three
years as an FBI agent. He has been president of the Indiana State Bar Association,
is a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation and is a member of various profes-
sional associations.
The writer of this article was assisted immeasurably throughout all phases of its
preparation by one of his law clerks, Mr. David Marks, Yale B.A. and J.D. Grate-
ful appreciation is expressed to him both for his brain in research and his brawn
in the necessary task involved in the continuing rotational movement of case books
between shelves and desk. Grateful appreciation is also expressed to the writer's
secretary, Mrs. Margaret Abernethy for her transcription of pipe-garbled dictation.
Both Mr. Marks and Mrs. Abernethy cheerfully volunteered extra hours to meet
deadlines.
1. In a narrower sense than treated in this article, the "doctrine of absten-
tion", generally accorded to have been sired by Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941), was, or at least is, merely one of the facets,
one which has had varying fortunes and one which will hereinafter for convenience
of reference be designated as the Pullman doctrine. If the Pullman doctrine was
not foreshadowed, it was at least placed in the position of being merely one as-
pect of abstention by the words of Mr. Justice Holmes in a railroad rate case: "Con-
siderations of comity and convenience have led this court ordinarily to decline to
inteifere by habeas corpus where the petitioner had open to him a writ of error to a
higher court of a state, in cases where there was no merely logical reason for re-
fusing the writ. The question is whether somewhat similar considerations ought not
to have some weight here." Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 229
(1908).
2. 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
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With the Aetna opinion in the public domain, one of the district
judges in the Seventh Circuit undertook to abstain, in part, at least,
in reliance on Aetna. While a reexamination of the Aetna opinion
by its author in the hindsight afforded by the preparation of this arti-
cle has caused a disturbing feeling that the words of approbation
erred on the side of undue kindness, they naturally were gratifying.
In due course, and in deference to the tradition that the unsuccessful
litigant entertains the idea that a ghastly mistake has been made, the
district court's case wended its way to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit. That court proceeded to reverse unanimously.3
The hope and scope of this article is directed toward the broad
area of the exercise or nonexercise of jurisdiction.4 While the appli-
cation of "the doctrine of abstention" has frequently been said to be
limited narrowly to a set of special circumstances, "abstention" is a
broad generic term encompassing multiple situations, both of judi-
cial and statutory origin. Its machinery of application can range
from a temporary stay through a dismissal with prejudice. It can
become operative because of some pedantically technical ground or
on account of a fundamental policy of government. It may be ob-
viously justifiable or its raison d' tre may be lost in legal obscuran-
tism. It may be called abstention or it may bear causative appella-
tions such as standing or mootness. Indeed, in its broadest sense it
is a many splendored device.
Obviously all facets of judicial self-restraint cannot be dealt with
even in an article of the ,projected breadth of the present one.
Therefore, hopefully with only minor deviations, the project will be
limited to those areas where judges have thought they were abstain-
ing or refraining from doing so. Perhaps the deviations can get by
as quasi-abstention. Noting the absence of the legal lore' on the
3. While an endeavor has been made throughout this article to provide sup-
portive footnote citations, distracting though they may be to the reader, the writer
with regard to the above bit of historical memorabilia has chosen to exercise the
author's privilege of spreading the cloak of anonymity. At the moment of writing
the petition for certiorari is still pending.
4. It is not proposed at this point to engage in the semantical exercise of dif-
ferentiating between failure to exercise jurisdiction because it is non-existent and
failure to do so even though it exists, as important as that differentiation on oc-
casion may be, e.g., on the availability of discretionary power.
5. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 52, p. 196 (2nd ed. 1970); 1 BARRON
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subject raised the question as to the desirability of the author's ab-
stention from the project. A further review of the cases, however,
reflected the utilization of factors, i.e., determining elements in the
abstention (nonabstention) process. In using this approach, the
writer intended to avoid insofar as possible metaphysical analyses of
what judges really intended (and probably never did) in their de-
cisions; in short, to engage in a pragmatic analysis of the stuff going
into the decisions.
All reasonable efforts have been made herein to avoid the expres-
sion of opinions as to what the law will be6 when it has not been de-
termined other than when the prognosis may seem clear and certain.
In any event, nothing herein is to be construed as an opinion of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
The factors are considered herein individually and specifically;
however, for a starting point, the comprehensive historical summary
of equity exceptions to federal exercise of jurisdiction written by Mr.
Chief Justice Stone in Meredith v. Winter Haven7 should be most
AND HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 64 (Wright ed. 1961);
IA MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 0.203 (1965); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (Official
Draft 1969); Lillich and Mundy, Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law
Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 888 (1971); Gowen and Izlar, Federal Court Ab-
stention in Diversity of Citizenship Litigation, 43 TEXAS L. REV. 194 (1964);
Kurland, Toward a Co-operative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention
Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 (1959); Wright, The Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37
TEXAS L REV. 815 (1959); Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurt-
er's Doctrine in an Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REV. 604 (1967); Note, Abstention
and Certification in Diversity Suits: "Perfection of Means and Confusion of Goals,"
73 YALE L. J. 850 (1964); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction: Problems Involved in
the Discretionary Use of the Abstention Doctrine, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 450; Note,
Consequences of Abstention by a Federal Court, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1358 (1960);
Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federalism, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 226 (1959);
Note, Judicial Abstention from the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COL. L. REV.
749 (1959); Annotation, Supreme Court's Definition and Application of Doctrine of
"Abstention" Where Questions of State Law are Controlling in Federal Civil Case,
20 L.Ed. 2d 1623 (1969).
6. At the outset of research, it had been conceived, although the West woods
are full of cases, that many of actual abstention were buried to practically all ex-
cept the involved litigants in unreported district court orders. Accordingly, a let-
ter of inquiry was directed to all district judges of the Seventh Circuit as to pos-
sible unreported orders. The results were meagre, which suggests either the con-
cept was incorrect or the judicial memory runneth not to unreported orders. With-
out exposing judicial foibles, it is observed that a familiar call to the law office
junior partner is, "Smith, what was the name of that case we had involving col-
lateral estoppel?"
7. 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943).
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helpful and is set forth as Appendix A of this article. Time has not
dimmed the sweep or general verity of his statement.
THE PRIMROSE PATH
DUTY TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION: The duty or obligation of federal
courts to exercise the jurisdiction properly accorded to them, as
stated in decisions, reflects both encomiastic and exhortatory aspects.
Buried in an 1821, 74 page opinion of Chief Justice Marshall are
the flat statements: "The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may,
avoid a measure, because it approaches the confines of the consti-
tution. We cannot pass it by, because it is doubtful. we have no
more right to decline exercise of jurisdiction which is given."8  Ab-
stention must still have been beyond the horizon of recognition al-
most a century later when Mr. Justice Peckham stated in Willcox v.
Consolidated Gas Co.' that no question of discretion or comity was
raised by the court's exercise of jurisdiction, for "[W]hen a Federal
court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law ju-
risdiction, it is its duty to take such jurisdiction. . . ."' Cases sub-
sequent to the recognition of abstention continue at least to pay lip
service to the duty although obviously the obligation is of a less un-
adulterated character than that which was conceived by the Chief
Justice.'1 The undoubted obligation of a federal court to proceed
to hear and dispose of a case properly before it is subject to absten-
tion only in certain exceptional cases.' 2
Recognizing Willcox as viable, the Supreme Court in 1964 opined
that there were fundamental objections to compelling a litigant with-
out his consent to accept a state court's determination of his federal
constitutional claims if he had properly invoked the jurisdiction of
the federal district court."3 No doubt as a necessary corollary to the
recognition of the right of the federal constitutional claimant to an
ultimate federal adjudication was Judge Cummings' articulation that
the "judiciary has always borne the basic responsibility for protect-
8. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 304 (1821).
9. 212 U.S. 19 (1909).
10. Id. at 40.
11. Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639, 645 (9th Cir. 1962).
12. Mach-tronics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1963).
13. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
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ing individuals against unconstitutional invasions of their rights by
all branches of the Government."" The federal courts are the pri-
mary forum for vindicating federal rights.'I
Another frequently quoted statement was authored by Judge Mur-
rah:
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under the
Federal Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we have
not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights as-
serted may be adjudicated in some other forum. 16
Further viability of the Willcox duty was again recognized in this
decade: unless there is an explicit exception to the duty of the fed-
eral court to hear a case to which Congress has extended its jurisdic-
tion, that duty may not be disregarded.17 There appears to be no
judicial discomfiture arising from the fact that the explicit exception
in the case of abstention is itself often judicially established.
While the deviation from the path of exercise of jurisdiction
might, at times, Lorelei-like, beckon as an easy disposition of a trou-
blesome case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter rejected the possibility as be-
ing
an unworthy conception of the federal judiciary to give weight to the suggestion that
acknowledgment of this power will tempt some otiose or timid judge to shuffle off re-
sponsibility. . . . Procedures for effective judicial administration presuppose a fed-
eral judiciary composed of judges well-equipped and of sturdy character in whom
may safely be vested, as is already, a wide range of judicial discretion, subject to ap-
propriate review on appeal.' 8
That the state courts have the solemn responsibility, equally with
the federal courts, to guard, enforce and protect every right granted
or secured by the United States would seem to be a springboard for
a plunge into the abstention pool. However, the Supreme Court,
without adverting to whether it had any opinion as to the manner
in which the state courts might measure up to their solemn responsi-
bility, did preclude the dual responsibility as being any escape hatch
from the duty, when solicited, of serving as a forum for federal con-
14. Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365, 1369-70 (7th Cir. 1969).
15. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 865 (2d Cir.
1970).
16. Stapleton v. Mitchell, 60 F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945).
17. Federal Savings & Loan Insurance Corp. v. Krueger, 435 F.2d 633, 637 (7th
Cir. 1970).
18. Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959).
ABSTENTION
stitutional claims. 9 The Supreme Court did, however, have occa-
sion to observe in the analogous habeas situation that "it cannot be
assumed that [the state courts] will be derelict in their duty" and
one of the primary grounds for the requirement of exhaustion of
state remedies is "the respect which federal courts have for the state
judicial processes .... ",20
POLICY FOR ABSTENTION: In essence, policy factors controlling, or
at least persuasive to, abstention or not abstaining are revealed by an
examination of the various factors mentioned by the courts; such
factors will be individually treated herein. Therefore, under the
present subcaption no more will be said than that insofar as the
Pullman doctrine enunciated in Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Pullman Co.2 itself is concerned, the writer of the opinion, Mr.
Justice Frankfurter, while indicating that Pullman and its progeny
had been equity cases stated, "[t]hey reflect a deeper policy derived
from our federalism."22  An examination of cases involving nonex-
ercise of jurisdiction, however, indicates that the policy derived from
federalism has a broader sweep than the Pullman doctrine cases.
JUDICIALLY ESTABLISHED: Certain types of abstinence are statutor-
ily mandated. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 provides: "The district court
shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collec-
tion of any tax under State law where a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in accordance with such State."23
Any study of the broad sweep of the applicability and/or de-
sirability of abstaining from the exercise of federal jurisdiction dis-
closes the development of factors found in the statutes and applied,
perhaps sometimes erroneously, in the nonstatutory cases. Never-
theless, while the source of abstention in its broadest sense may be
statutory as well as nonstatutory, the statement is not infrequently
seen in the cases that abstention is judicially established. 4
19. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
20. Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 679 (1949). Mr. Justice Holmes also im-
plicitly accorded similar recognition to state procedures in a railroad rate case.
Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
21. Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
22. Louisiana P. & L. Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959).
23. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1342 dealing with rate orders of state agencies; 28
U.S.C. § 2283 the so-called anti-injunction statute and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 pertaining
to the exhaustion of remedies by persons in state custody.
24. E.g., England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) "Abstention
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VIABILITY OF THE PULLMAN DOCTRINE: The Pullman doctrine, at
least as it stood in 1964, subsequent to the departure of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter from the Court, was summarized as follows:
The doctrine contemplates only 'that controversies involving unsettled questions of
state law [may] be decided in the state tribunals preliminary to a federal court's
consideration of the underlying federal constitutional questions,' 'that decision
of the federal question be deferred until the potentially controlling state-law is-
sue is authoritatively put to rest,' 'that federal courts do not decide questions of
constitutionality on the basis of preliminary guesses regarding local law,' 'that
these enactments should be exposed to state construction or limiting interpreta-
tion before the federal courts are asked to decide upon their constitutionality'. 2 5
In 1967 the observation was made that the retirement of Mr. Jus-
tice Frankfurter in 1962 left the abstention doctrine a judicial or-
phan unable to muster the enthusiastic majority typical of its earlier
years. 26 Whether or not properly accomplished by Reetz v. Boza-
nich,27 which one commentator has characterized as a "sport,"2 and
the later buttressing of Askew v. Hargrave,2" nevertheless, it may
arguably be asserted that the status of orphanage was prematurely
accorded. The line of cases beginning with Younger v. Harris"
will not disturb a view of an underlying rationale favorable to the
exercise of judicial abstention.
Professor Kurland was not surprised that the abstention doctrine
had become moribund in an activist court, and even after evaluating
Reetz, opined that self-restraint was not yet reinstated as the govern-
ing principle of the Court."1
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit early in 1971 made the flat state-
ment that the principle of abstention retains its full vitality today. 2
In a more recent case, Judge Kaufman of the Second Circuit, after
is a judge-fashioned vehicle for according appropriate deference to the 'respective
competence of the state and federal court systms.'"
25. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 n.7 (1964) (citations
omitted).
26. Note, Federal-Question Abstention: Justice Frankfurter's Doctrine in an
Activist Era, 80 HARV. L. REv. 604 (1967).
27. 397 U.S. 82 (1970).
28. Kurland, The Supreme Court Review 81 (1970).
29. 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
30. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
31. "No self-denying ordinance could be appropriate to a jurisprudence that re-
garded the federal courts as curer of all ills of American society." Kurland, supra
note 31 at 80.
32. Hill v. City of El Paso, Texas, 437 F.2d 352, 356 (5th Cir. 1971).
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a brief tracing of the historical treatment of the Pullman doctrine,
observed that "the last two Terms of the Court have witnessed the
rejuvenation of the full implications of the Pullman doctrine.""
EQUITABLE V. LEGAL RELIEF: Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc.,34 indi-
cates that while the roots of the abstention principle may rely on
federal equity jurisdiction, the application of the abstention doctrine
no longer depends on whether a complaint has demanded equitable
or legal relief. No case has come to the writer's attention indicating
that this portion of the opinion is less than viable although no doubt
equitable principles continue to underlie much of the abstention law.
DISCRETION: Assuming frequency of reference in the cases is a
proper criterion, one of the brightly blooming blossoms on the path of
abstention is the word "discretion. '3 5  A review of the number of
cases where the word "discretion" was at least voiced presents the
possibility that district courts may have, after an appellate court de-
cision, speculated as to whether the word had any real significance.
In Baggett v. Bullitt,8 6 a three-judge district court had abstained
from ruling on a 1931 Washington state oath statute which had
never been interpreted by the courts of that state. While Justices
Clark and Harlan were of the opinion that Washington's highest
court should be afforded an opportunity to construe the statute,37 the
majority held that while abstention involves a discretionary exercise
of a court's equity power, it is not an automatic rule applied when-
ever a federal court is faced with a doubtful issue of state law.3 8
By way of contrast, in Harman v. Forssenius,3 9 the Court stated that
in applying the doctrine of abstention, "a federal district court is in-
vested with discretion to decline to exercise or to postpone the exer-
cise of its jurisdiction in deference to state court resolution of under-
lying issues of state law."40  The three-judge district court refused to
abstain and the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed.
33. Reid v. Board of Education, 453 F.2d 238, 242 (2d Cir. 1971).
34. 293 F.2d 835, 841-42 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925, rehear-
ing denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
35. Because of the not infrequent entanglements involved in the exercise of
discretion, it may be assumed that a flower-bearing vine is involved.
36. 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
37. Id. at 384.
38. id. at 375.
39. 380 U.S. 528 (1965).
40. Id. at 534.
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In Sarfaty v. Nowak,4 the plaintiffs asserted that the doctrine of
abstention did not apply where irreparable damage would occur to
protected constitutional rights. Both sides relied upon the recently
decided Dombrowski v. Plister.4 The court held that the district
court in its sound judicial discretion properly applied the doctrine by
abstaining. While the reported case does not indicate that an in-
junction was sought against pending criminal proceedings, injunctive
relief was sought as to enforcement of certain liquor laws.
Readers of appellate court opinions are aware of the fact that
many matters occurring at the trial court level are viewed as being
matters of the trial court's discretion, for example, the limitation on
the scope of cross-examination. No doubt in any case of review of
the exercise of discretion, a significant background factor is the im-
pact that the exercise has on the complaining litigant. It probably
could be safely stated that, at least in the case of failing to exercise
jurisdiction by abstinence, there is a built-in impact. In any event,
upon reading the cases, one sometimes comes away with a feeling
that the appellate examination of the district court's action in regard
to abstention has certain de novo overtones, a feeling no doubt
shared by a reversed district court.
To the extent that determination of the correctness of abstention
or nonabstention is truly a matter of discretion rather than a me-
chanical application of judicially established rules of thumb, some of
which apparently have come along after the act, it would seem that
the ordinary rules pertaining to evaluation of discretionary action
should apply. The test is said to be that a trial court's exercise of
discretion may be set aside only if arbitrary or if no reasonable man
would take the view adopted by the trial court. Conversely, of
course, if reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the ac-
tion taken, then it cannot be said that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion.43
RESOLUTION OF STATE LAW DISPOSITIVE: In Railroad Commission
v. Pullman Co.,44 Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointed out several ways in
41. 369 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966).
42. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. Particle Data Laboratories, Inc. v. Coulter Electronics Inc. 420 F.2d 1174,
1178 (7th Cir. 1969).
44. 312 U.S. 496, (1941).
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which a state court resolution of the issues before the federal court
would eliminate the necessity for further federal jurisdiction. One
of the classic statements in the field followed: "In the absence of
any showing that these obvious methods for securing a definitive
ruling in the state courts cannot be pursued with full protection of
the constitutional claim, the district court should exercise its wise
discretion by staying its hands." 5  With perhaps refining, or some-
times extending phraseology, subsequent cases approving abstention
have indicated this approach as a key factor.
One aspect of the foregoing rule certainly is that construction of a
statute by the state court may remove the constitutional issue from
the federal case. Conversely, and this would seem to be a matter
of certainty of state law, the rule is stated that whenever the statute
is obviously applicable to the plaintiff in his course of conduct or
when the statute is not susceptible to a construction that will other-
wise avoid the necessity of deciding a constitutional question, the
federal court may not properly stay its hand.
46
As might be expected, when a definitive ruling on state law ques-
tions would neither control the outcome of the litigation nor obviate
the need to adjudicate the issues, basis for abstention would not or-
dinarily be found.47 State court action could be dispositive of the
issue either by narrowing the state statute to bring it within federal
constitutional limits or by finding that it was unconstitutional al-
together.
Where a statute is void for overbreadth and is both clear and pre-
cise, there would be no basis for the possibility of a narrowing state
court construction so as to render unnecessary a decision on a con-
stitutional challenge.48 It was also brought out in United Steel
Workers of America (AFL-CIO) v. Bagwell,49 in the event the
statute is not susceptible to the narrowing construction then resort to
the state court is not indicated. This does not, however, seem to
meet the possibility of the state court itself voiding the statute on
45. Id. at 501.
46. United Steel Workers of America (AFL-CIO; v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492,
495 (4thCir. 1967).
47. Barrera v. Wheeler, 441 F.2d 795, 801 (8th Cir. 1971).
48. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 250 (1967).
49. 383 F.2d at 495.
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grounds of constitutionality. It has been indicated in federal judicial
utterances that it cannot be thought that the state court judges have
less fidelity to the due process requirements of the federal constitu-
tion than do federal judges. 0 It could be readily argued on this
basis that unless the state court had already declared its statute con-
stitutional, the case should always be remitted to the state court to
give it the first opportunity to declare the statute unconstitutional.
Cases need not be cited, however, to show the incorrectness of this
proposition in practice.
The difficulties of prognostication in the present area are reflected
by cases arising in the October, 1970, term of the Supreme Court.
In Fornaris v. Ridge Tool Co.,"1 the abstention doctrine was applied
where a relatively new Puerto Rican statute, which had not been
authoritatively construed by the Commonwealth courts, was suscep-
tible by Commonwealth judicial confinement to a more narrow am-
bit which would avoid all constitutional questions. The federal
courts were ordered to stay their hand until the Puerto Rican courts
had spoken. However, in Wisconsin v. Constantineau,2 the Court
had no difficulty in deciding that the hand should not be stayed.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger, in dissenting, stated that "[f]or all
we know, the state courts would find this statute invalid under the
State Constitution, but no one on either side of the case thought to
discuss this or exhibit any interest in the subject.""'
One might arguably conclude that where a statute was clearly
unconstitutional on its face and the district court had declined to
abstain, the tendency on the appellate level would not be at that
point to disturb the district court's discretion by remitting the case
to the state court. Whether the reverse of this situation, with clear
unconstitutionality but in which the district court had abstained, is
true is less clear, even arguably. In any event, other applicable fac-
tors can never be disregarded. 4
50. See Mr. Chief Justice Burger dissenting in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433, 440 (1971).
51. 400 U.S. 41 (1970).
52. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
53. Id. at 440.
54. For example, the applicability of the so-called anti-injunction statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2283 or the line of cases of which the lead-off was Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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DIFFICULTY OF STATE LAW DETERMINATION: As an initial premise,
it appears to be well established that the mere fact the district court in
the exercise of diversity jurisdiction is required to make decisions
based upon an undecided question of state law is not alone a suffi-
cient ground for declining jurisdiction; or stating it otherwise, it is
not to be used to impede the normal course of action where federal
courts have been granted jurisdiction of the controversy. 5
The matter of what state law is, however, is not a homogeneous
panoply. It may range, on the one hand, from a relatively simple
issue which has not been precisely determined but the resolution of
which is pointed to by numerous state decisions, while, at the oppo-
site end of the pole, there may be exceedingly complex and difficult
issues with weighty public policy overtones. The question presents
itself whether progression toward the difficult and complex is ac-
companied by greater persuasiveness toward abstension. Frequent-
ly, it is stated that such is not the case although here, as in the con-
sideration of other factors, absolutes are hard to come by.
Meredith v. Winter Haven56 is frequently cited for the proposi-
tion that the mere difficulty of ascertaining what the state courts
may thereafter determine the state law to be is not in itself a suf-
ficient ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its juris-
diction to decide a case which is properly brought to it for a de-
cision. 7
The Meredith concept has been extended to the effect that the
fact that the issues of state law are novel or -unsettled or are excep-
tionally difficult or complex is insufficient reason to invoke absten-
tion. 8 A striking illustration of this principle is found in Akin v.
Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge.59 Involved was the ef-
fect of a Texas court nullification of a New Mexico decree of adop-
55. Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Frazier, 289 F.2d 849, 853 (9th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 835 (1962).
56. 320 U.S. 228 (1943).
57. In re Mohammed, 327 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1964). After stating the
rule flatly, it is of interest to note that Judge Magruder held that in the situa-
tion before the court there was "no essential circumstance which would indicate
a different conclusion." See also Tomiyasu v. Golden, 358 F.2d 651, 654 (9th
Cir. 1966); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1970).
58. Sayers v. Forsyth Building Corp., 417 F.2d 65, 73 (5th Cir. 1969).
59. 322 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1963).
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tion urged by a Texas plaintiff as a reason for her right to "forced"
heirship in the estate of a Louisiana resident. The court held that
the plaintiff under these circumstances had a right to choose a fed-
eral forum and it was the court's duty to take jurisdiction of the
case.
While subscribing to the view that the difficult nature of local
questions properly presented in federal courts is not alone sufficient
cause for abstention in favor of state jurisdiction, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit in Tomiyasu v. Golden0 apparently con-
sidered the resolution of the state issue to be of a sufficiently techni-
cal nature, together with the fact that a preliminary question to the
determination of such issue involving the same parties had not been
resolved by the state court, to be sufficient bases for abstaining.
While the decade that has passed since the en banc decision of
the District of Columbia Circuit in Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc.,61
a segregation in public facilities case, has relegated much of that
opinion to a category of historical interest only, the court observed
that "[i]t is, at the very least, unseemly for a Federal court to
'guess at the resolution of uncertain and difficult issues of state
law.' "62 When this statement is contrasted with pronouncements of
the duty of resolving state law, no matter how difficult, it might
seem that the seemliness is more dependent upon sociological-politi-
cal aspects than the uncertainty or difficulty of resolving questions
of state law.
While it seems that the district court will find slight encourage-
ment for abstention in the face of the problem of state law, it has
nevertheless been stated that when that state law has been deter-
mined, the federal courts must apply the most recent interpretation
thereof in diversity cases. 63
POSSIBILITY OF CONTRARY LATER STATE DETERMINATION: The
mere possibility that a decision of a state law issue, by a federal court
60. 358 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1963).
61. 293 F.2d 835 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 925 (1962), rehearing
denied, 371 U.S. 854 (1962).
62. Id. at 841.
63. Middle Atlantic Utilities Co. v. S.M.W. Development Corp., 392 F.2d 380,
384 (2d Cir. 1968). One nationally circulated magazine might, it seems, have put
this item in its "Department of things that need not have been said."
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in a diversity case, not previously decided by a state court, might there-
after be a matter which is found with hindsight to contravene a sub-
sequent determination of the same issue by the state court is in itself no
ground for abstention. 4
AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW OF STATE ACTION BY U.S. SUPREME
COURT: Arguably, a litigant would not be deprived of an adjudication
of his federal rights by the federal district court action of abstaining
and sending him to the state courts since direct review could eventually
be sought in the United States Supreme Court. That Court, how-
ever, has stated that such review, "even when available by appeal
rather than only by discretionary writ of certiorari, is an inadequate
substitute for the initial District Court determination-often by the
three judges-to which the litigant is entitled in the federal courts. '""a
AVAILABILITY OF STATE PROCEDURES: The application of logic in
the area of abstention would seem to require that if there is a deferral
to state jurisdiction, a sine qua non would be the availability of state
procedure. The quality of the state remedy is commented on else-
where herein but the mere suggestion of availability would seem to
connote that the state remedy must be real and not futile or illusory.
That it would be the latter may be established by the litigant's prior
state efforts.66 Availability, it seems, should also run to the matter
of the likelihood of a reasonably early determination of state law
which has not been theretofore crystallized. Thus, a statutory pro-
vision which had been in effect for 39 years had never been tested
or interpreted at the appellate level in the state and no such case was
pending or contemplated. This was determined to be an appropriate
background for a finding of no abuse of discretion in the district
court's refusal to abstain. 7
In a teacher discharge case, the court considered whether suit in
the district court might not be premature since conceivably the vote
at a school meeting might be in plaintiff's favor. The court recog-
64. Martin v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 375 F.2d 720, 722 (4th
Cir. 1967).
65. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416
(1964).
66. Monongahela Connecting R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. U. Comm., 373 F.2d
142, 146 (3d Cir. 1967).
67. Vale v. Gary National Bank, 406 F.2d 39, 44 (7th Cir. 1969).
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nized that dismissal arising out of the classroom use of "a vulgar
term for an incestuous son" was a foregone conclusion. Thus, un-
der the circumstances, the Court of Appeals accepted jurisdiction.6 8
In a Third Circuit case,69 the court pointed out that appellant had
sought the aid of federal courts because it was evident that all ef-
forts to raise the federal question on the state level had failed. The
district judge apparently felt that another attack should be taken by
testing the power and authority of the public utility commission by
seeking an injunction in the state court. The court of appeals dis-
agreed with the exercise of the discretion and held that where it
clearly appeared that the plaintiff was confronted with a serious
block at the state level and jurisdiction existed in both courts, the
abstention theory should not be applied.
The fact that jurisdiction has been taken which has permitted the
availability of state action to become nonexistent by the bar of a
statute of limitations has been indicative of foreclosing the district
court's exercise of discretion to abstain, since the state remedy is no
longer available.70 Conversely, however, as in the case of many
other factors standing alone, the fact that a state remedy is available
is not by itself a valid basis for federal court's abstention. 71 Never-
theless, when other factors enter the picture, perhaps even only one
additional factor being that the state action involved state consti-
tutional claims, the sustainment of which would obviate the need for
determining the federal issue, abstention may be warranted. 72
What has been said with regard to availability of state remedies,
of course, is primarily directed at state judicial remedies. However,
other types of remedies may be available. In an apportionment
case, the Supreme Court pointed out that, except as an interim re-
medial procedure justifying a court in staying its hand temporarily,
there is no significance in the fact that a non-judicial, political rem-
edy might be available to effect rights to equal representation in a
68. Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 n.6 (1st Cir. 1969).
69. Monongahela Connecting R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. U. Comm., 373 F.2d
142 (3d Cir. 1967).
70. Foster v. City of Detroit, 405 F.2d 138, 145 (6th Cir. 1968), motion de-
nied, 423 F.2d 660.
71. Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1300 (5th Cir. 1970).
72. Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971).
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state legislature. "Courts sit to adjudicate controversies involving
alleged denials of constitutional rights. 7 3
QUALITY OF ALTERNATE REMEDY: It has been indicated elsewhere
herein that the alternate state remedy, when abstention is utilized,
must be real and not merely illusory. Thus, it is no surprise to find
articulated that a plain, speedy and efficient remedy for the claim
asserted must be available in the state courts." The requirement
has also been phrased in terms of "plain, adequate and complete. '71
The strain, or factor, here involved is found in other areas of ab-
stention. In the recent case of Parisi v. Davidson,'76 the Supreme
Court had before it the question of whether a federal court should
postpone adjudication in a civil suit clearly within its original juris-
diction where there were pending court-martial proceedings involv-
ing petitioner, a member of the Armed Forces who had applied un-
successfully for a discharge as a conscientious objector. The Court
stated that the judicial hand should be stayed only if the relief re-
quested would also be available to the petitioner with reasonable
promptness and certainty through the machinery of the military judi-
cial system in its processing of the court-martial charge. The Court
was not persuaded that such relief would be even potentially avail-
able, much less that it would be either prompt or certain.
The factor is also observed as a statutory principle. Thus, a dis-
trict court shall not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy
or collection of any tax under state law "where a plain, speedy and
efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State. ' '77
SUBSEQUENT STATE REMEDY: In Foster v. City of Detroit,7 the city
argued that even though federal jurisdiction may have been proper
when invoked at the time the suit was commenced, subsequent de-
73. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 736
(1964).
74. Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township School District No. 3, 378 F.2d
225, 230 (6th Cir. 1967).
75. Holmes v. New York City Housing Authority, 398 F.2d 262, 267 n.7 (2d
Cir. 1968).
76. 40 U.S.L.W. 4177 (Feb. 23, 1972).
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1341. See, for an application of the statute, where the court
found that the state remedies were plain, speedy, and efficient, Natural Gas Pipe
Co. of America v. Sergeant, 40 U.S.L.W: 2458 (U.S.D.C. Kan., Jan. 12, 1972).
78. 405 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1968).
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cisions of the Michigan Supreme Court provided plaintiffs a remedy
in the Michigan courts and that federal district court jurisdiction
was thereby lost. The Sixth Circuit summarily disposed of the con-
tention by stating that the jurisdiction, once properly invoked, re-
mained.
LOCAL EXPERTISE: The first aspect of this factor is the considera-
tion given by the courts to the likelihood that a state court may be able
to cope more knowledgeably with the state law than the federal
courts. The second aspect is that a federal judge himself may be
thoroughly trained, from his own days of practice, in the state law
with which he is asked to deal. The matter, of course, is particularly
true of the district judge, who ordinarily is holding court in the
state in which he was a practitioner. Further, the induction to the
district court bench has probably never placed a wall between the
judge and his continuing knowledge of his own state law, a status
made even more true by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins."9
The Second Circuit impliedly recognized this factor in dictum by
referring to the possibility of the administration of a complex state
process in which state courts have greater expertise.8 1 In addition,
Mr. Justice Douglas in Jackson v. Ogilvie"' stated that "federal
courts are usually less able than state courts to work their way
through a maze of state electoral laws." In the analogous case of
pendent jurisdiction, Mr. Justice Brennan in Mineworkers v.
Gibbs,12 in referring to the necessity for avoiding needless decisions
of state law, referred to "procuring for them a surer-footed reading
of applicable law." It is assumed Mr. Justice Brennan was not
necessarily referring to a more expeditious reading.
An illustration of the first aspect of local expertise is found in a
recent Second Circuit case. 8 Involved before the court was an in-
terpretation of a Connecticut statute in connection with a suit against
an insurance company wherein plaintiff's judgment against the in-
79. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 865 (2d Cir.
1970).
81. 401 U.S. 904 (1971).
82. 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).




sured was approximately $75,000 more than the coverage. The in-
surance company asserted that there should have been settlement
within the policy limits. Recognizing that in the diversity action it
was necessary to predict the result which the Supreme Court of Con-
necticut would reach as to the statute, which had been on the books
since 1919 and had been previously construed in only one federal case,
the majority opinion, without reference to any possibility of absten-
tion, proceeded to arrive at an interpretation differing from that
of the district court. 4 The dissenting opinion stated that not only did
the majority opinion run counter to Connecticut legislative policy but
that the court was reversing the decision of a trial judge well versed in
Connecticut law. With the statute having venerability of more than a
half a century, it would seem that the likelihood of an interpretation by
the Connecticut Supreme Court, in the absence of the showing of a
pending case, was scarcely persuasive for not proceeding with an in-
terpretation of the state statute.
An even more recent case reflects the deference which may be
accorded to what has been termed local expertise. In a case in-
volving interpretation of a Georgia abusive language statute, Mr.
Justice Brennan stated, "[t]he District Judge and one member of
the unanimous Court of Appeals panel were Georgia practitioners
before they ascended the bench. Their views of Georgia law neces-
sarily are persuasive with us.""5  So that this will not be construed
as a carte blanche elimination of any further inquiry, in the next
sentence of the opinion the statement was made that "we have, how-
ever, made our own examination of the Georgia cases, both those
cited and others discovered in research."
The Fifth Circuit has been reluctant to substitute its view of state
law for that of the district court sitting in the state and experienced
in its jurisprudence.' 6 This approach, however, might seem to lead
to some undesirable subjective evaluations.
Upon analysis, the present factor in its first aspect is possibly sus-
ceptible to the charge of mislabeling as the criterion is not so much
84. Connecticut apparently has no certification procedure. Lillich and Mundy,
Federal Court Certification of Doubtful State Law Questions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
880 (1971).
85. Gooding v. Wilson, - U.S. -, 40 U.S.L.W. 4329, 4331 (5th Cir.,
March 23, 1972).
86. Petersen v. Klos, 433 F.2d 911, 912 (5th Cir. 1970).
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that state courts can more accurately interpret state law but rather
that they can more authoritatively do so. This seems to be borne
out by Mr. Justice Frankfurter's words in the Pullman case87 which
pointed out that no matter how seasoned the judgment of the dis-
trict court might be, it could not escape being a forecast rather than
a determination and the last word on the statutory authority of the
railroad commission in the case before the court belonged not to
any federal court but to the Supreme Court of Texas. The tentative
answer of the federal court might be displaced the next day by a
state adjudication. This, of course, is the attendant risk, or duty if
you will, placed upon, and accepted by, the federal courts in nu-
merous cases. A complete extension of the rationale would certain-
ly lower the caseload in the federal courts.
CERTAINTY OF STATE LAW: This factor in abstention is probably
merely a variation, or an extension, of the difficulty of determining
state law. As might be expected, the cases reflect that where the state
law is certain, the need for abstention is minimized, if not elim-
inated, 88 but not necessarily conversely, where the state law is un-
certain. Consideration, at least, will be more likely given to the de-
sirability of abstention.8
Whether uncertainty of the state law is a key to the door of absten-
tion seems to be to a considerable extent dependent upon the type
of litigation involved. In diversity cases, it generally appears that
the uncertainty of state laws is unlikely to provide a basis for absten-
tion. In Stool v. J.C. Penney Co.,9" the court stated flatly that a
federal diversity court "cannot decline to exercise its jurisdiction
even though the state law which it is bound to apply cannot be
found with certainty." The court in connection with the duty of
87. Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
88. Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964), "plain and unambiguous", Northside
Bible Church v. Goodson, 387 F.2d 534, 537 (5th Cir. 1967), "plain in its mean-
ing,", Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 1970), "the cloth of state law
is, as here, off the loom and there can be no doubt as to what the state law pro-
vides;", Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 439 (1971), "uncomplicated by
an unresolved state law."
89. Akin v. Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge, 322 F.2d 749, 756 (5th
Cir. 1963). The lack of complete certainty is not in itself sufficient reason for
refusal to exercise jurisdiction; Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 86 (1970), absten-
tion "should be applied only where 'the issue of state law is uncertain.'"
90. 404 F.2d 562, 563 (5th Cir. 1969).
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ascertainment imposed upon the federal court further stated the fol-
lowing:
We therefore fall back on formulary surrogates to account for our mysterious appli-
cation of an uncoined code. Thus where the controlling state law eludes the re-
searcher, the court must attempt to ascertain the policy inclination of the state's
highest tribunal with regard to the matter in controversy. Failing that, the court
may assume that the state courts would adopt the rule which, in its view, is supported
by the thrust of logic and authority. 91
In non-diversity cases where federal issues exist, it would appear
that the uncertainty of state law would probably be accorded greater
weight than in the diversity situation. Furthermore, even where
flat statements are made in the diversity situation, it is customary to
find that both in the area of difficulty and lack of certainty, signifi-
cance must be attached to the ordinarily qualifying words, "standing
alone." The Supreme Court has had no difficulty in finding ab-
stention applicable in diversity cases, even though there may have
been a federal constitutional issue raised by the pleadings.92
ENTANGLEMENT IN STATE LAW: The Second Circuit, in finding that
abstention was not appropriate in the case before it, mentioned,
inter alia, the factor that the actions were not entangled in state
law.93 It seems clear that the lack of such entanglement in a federal
issue would not result in abstention. Whether the reverse is always
true is perhaps arguable although in any event it would probably
only mean that this would be a factor for abstention, the weight of
which could only be determined upon an individual case basis. The
Supreme Court stated the matter somewhat more dramatically and
completely in McNeese v. Board of Education94 as follows: "Nor is
the federal right in any way entangled in a skein of state law that
must be untangled before the federal case can proceed."
STATE CONSTITUTION V. STATE COMMON LAW QUESTIONS: In reli-
ance on a three-judge district court decision,9" the Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit stated in 1970 that the circuit had recognized ab-
stention in a case involving construction of the constitution of a state
91. Id. at 563.
92. See, e.g., United Gas Co. v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134 (1962).
93. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853, 865 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 853 (1970).
94. 373 U.S. 668, 674 (1963).
95. Nolan v. Rhodes, 251 F. Supp. 584 (S.D. Ohio 1965), a!f'd, 383 U.S. 104
(1966).
19721
DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
but that abstention was not ordinarily granted in cases involving
common law questions which the federal court under its diversity
jurisdiction is bound to decideY6 While the statement that the fed-
eral court "is bound to decide" might seem to be on the strong
side, as there are relatively few absolutes, if any, in the area of ab-
stention, it would appear to the writer of this article that some differ-
entiation between cases involving a state constitution and the com-
mon law of the same state is warranted although this would seem to
be a matter of weight rather than mandate.
Support for the differentiation may be found in Reetz v. Boza-
nich,97 in the following: "The Pullman doctrine was based on 'the
avoidance of needless friction' between federal pronouncements and
state policies. . . . The instant case is a classic case in that tradition,
for here the nub of the whole controversy may be the state constitu-
tion." Particular significance may be accorded the language used
in Reetz since the opinion was written for a unanimous Court by
Mr. Justice Douglas who himself has been cast in the role of dis-
senter in cases approving abstention 8
CERTIFICATION OF STATE LAW QUESTIONS: One well-founded judi-
cial complaint concerning the application of abstention, a complaint
which ordinarily will have the joinder of a plaintiff, is the possible
delay inherent in the situation. This matter as a factor is discussed
elsewhere herein. However, a possible means of expediting the de-
termination of state law is found in the procedure of certification by
federal courts of doubtful state law questions to state high courts for
decision." It is sufficient to note here that the procedure is of re-
cent origin and, until 1965, Florida was the only state with estab-
lished certification procedure and it had only occasionally been in-
voked. In the past six years, six additional states have followed
Florida's lead, and the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have
96. Krakoff v. United States, 431 F.2d 847, 848 (6th Cir. 1970). It is noted
that Circuit Judge Weick, the author of the Krakoff opinion, was the circuit judge
assigned to the three-judge court in the Nolan case, supra, which had issued a per
curiam opinion.
97. 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970).
98. See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 US. 219, 226 (1959), and United Gas Co.
v. Ideal Cement Co., 369 U.S. 134, 136 (1962).
99. Lillich & Mundy, Federal Courts Certification of Doubtful State Law Ques-
tions, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 888 (1971).
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adopted a Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act. A
number of states will undoubtedly adopt the Uniform Act or varia-
tions thereof in the next few years.' 0
At least one additional state, Indiana, has adopted a variation of
the Uniform Act."' The Indiana statute limits by its terms the
certifying courts to the federal appellate courts. While the proce-
dure may be helpful to these courts it obviously is not an answer to
the question of the inherent delay in abstention. The Uniform Act
is broader and includes United States district courts and, as a brack-
eted possible addition, the highest appellate court or the intermediate
appellate court of any other state. 1 2
The Supreme Court in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.'03 not-
ed the Florida facilitating statute and in Aldrich v. Aldrich,' on
its own motion, certified a question of law to the Supreme Court of
Florida. While it might not seem to require stating, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has had occasion to observe that in the
absence of a statute or rule in the state authorizing certification pro-
cedure, resort could not be had to the state Supreme Court. The
state Supreme Courts, of course, do not ordinarily render advisory
opinions. °
In the situation when a state does not have certification proce-
dures, the alternative of a state declaratory judgment action is sug-
gested by the Supreme Court in United Gas Co. v. Ideal Cement
Co.'
06
ACTIONS PENDING IN BOTH STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS: In Lib-
erty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co.,0 7 a diversity case in
100. Id. at 888.
101. IND. ANN. STAT., § 4-109(a) (1968).
102. 18 U.C.L.A. L. Rv., supra note 104, at 913. The authors note that the
original Florida Statute did not permit district court certification and that there are
at least two reasons for restricting certification to appellate level courts: First,
the number of potential cases is reduced and second, the problem of premature cer-
tification is avoided. An intermediate alternative is suggested of allowing certification
by three-judge district courts. It is also, of course, necessary in the ordinary case
for the district court to resolve factual disputes before reaching the law questions.
103. 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
104. 375 U.S. 249 (1963).
105. Krakoff v. United States, 431 F.2d 847, 848 (6th Cir. 1970).
106. 369 U.S. 134, 135 (1962).
107. 322 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1963).
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which there was admitted federal jurisdiction, the district court had
dismissed the action after pretrial development of the fact that all
of the parties except one were litigating the same issues in state court
actions. The district court apparently felt that it was fruitless to liti-
gate the issues in both the federal and state actions. The Court of
Appeals brushed aside the applicability of the doctrine of abstention
as being an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of the
district court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. The
court held that in an in personam action to recover money damages
paid pursuant to insurance contracts for damage to property occa-
sioned by negligence, a federal district court is without authority to
abdicate its admitted diversity jurisdiction by dismissing the action
solely on the ground that other litigation is pending in a state court
involving substantially the same parties and subject matter even
though done in order to obtain complete justice and avoid multiple
litigation.
As indicated previously, the scope of this article is to consider ab-
stention in a broader sense than that to which the court referred in
Liberty Mutual. As far as can be seen at this time, there is no firm
signal on the horizon that the build-up of pending litigation in all
courts might make the avoidance of multiple litigation a more im-
portant factor for abstention. It would not seem to be beyond the
realm of possibility. Indeed, in Liberty Mutual, the court expressly
noted that it was not required to determine whether the district court
would have been justified in staying the action in that court pend-
ing the termination of the controversy in the state courts which, of
course, is abstention in the broader sense.
In Tomiyasu v. Golden,1"8 the situation was only analogous in
that the state litigation was not pending at the time of the district
court action. However, the Court of Appeals treated the district
court action as in the nature of a collateral attack on state court pro-
ceedings and held that the district court should have abstained and
dismissed. The court rather obviously balanced several factors in
arriving at its conclusion including the factor that the issues raised
should be left to those preeminently competent to answer them.
The circumstances here that were being raised in the district court
108. 358 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1966).
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had not been considered in the state court actions. The principal
exceptional circumstances seem to have been that otherwise there
would be interference with the policies of the state court plus ques-
tions of strictly state law.
In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co.,0 9 in a short per curiam
opinion, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in
refusing to stay its hand in a case in which the state law issue was
crucial, was one of vital concern in the state involved and was a
truly novel one which eventually would have to be resolved by the
state courts. A declaratory judgment was actually pending at the
time and in all likelihood a resolution would soon be forthcoming.
"Sound judicial administration requires that the parties in this case
be given the benefit of the same rule of law which would apply to
all other businesses and land owners concerned with the use of this
vital state resource."' 1 °  Federal jurisdiction was ordered retained
in the district court in order to insure a just disposition of litigation
should anything prevent a prompt state court determination. Jus-
tices Brennan, Douglas and Marshall specially concurred on the
ground that the case presented one of the narrowly limited special
circumstances which justified the invocation of the judge-made doc-
trine of abstention.
Upon balancing, however, it may become obvious that the state
court is not the proper forum to determine the issues for a combination
of reasons such as differences of issues, differences of parties and ven-
erability of the litigation. Rather, the federal court must face the
necessity of untangling the complex web which has resulted in the dif-
ferences between the parties and thereby has engendered extensive liti-
gation in both the federal and state courts."'
In a recent Tenth Circuit case, the court of appeals differentiated
between a diversity claim for deed cancellation and an action for
declaratory judgment to invalidate an agreement. On analysis, find-
ing no sufficient special circumstances, the court reversed the dis-
trict court insofar as it had dismissed the claim for deed cancellation
but held that the district court had properly declined to exercise diver-
109. 391 U.S. 593 (1968).
110. ld. at594.
111. Sayers v. Forsyth Building Corp., 417 F.2d 65, 74 (5th Cir. 1969).
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sity jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action raising state law is-
sues which were being presented contemporaneously to state courts.
The distinction here would seem to lie in the holding that federal
courts are under no compulsion to exercise jurisdiction over suits
brought under the Declaratory Judgment Act."' Under the circum-
stances, the dismissal of the declaratory judgment action was not an
abuse of discretion, but the absence of special circumstances consti-
tuted abuse in an ordinary diversity case where federal jurisdiction
had been properly invoked. 1' 3
Perhaps it is fair to say that the pendency of another action in-
volving substantially similar issues and the same parties is not stand-
ing alone entitled to persuasive weight in favor of abstention where
federal jurisdiction exists, which is not to say that it has no weight
when taken with other factors." 4
FEDERAL-STATE FRICTIONS: In the application of the classic Pull-
man abstention doctrine, indeed throughout abstention cases, a princi-
pal underlying factor for judicial determination is the possibility of un-
duly disrupting federal-state relations. Mr. Justice Frankfurter
dwelt at some length on the subject in Pullman."5 He observed
that few public interests have a higher claim on the discretion of a
federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state
policies. Referring to earlier cases, he stated that they reflected a
doctrine of abstention appropriate to the federal system whereby the
federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, restrained their authority
because of scrupulous regard for the rightful independence of state
governments and for the smooth working of the federal judiciary.
Noting that the use of equitable powers in this sense was a contribu-
tion of the courts in furthering the harmonious relations between
state and federal authority, the need was eliminated for a rigorous
congressional restriction of the courts' powers. This doctrine of
judicial restraint was no doubt foreshadowed in Mr. Justice Holmes'
philosophy." 6
While the matter of comity, or elimination of federal-state friction,
112. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1964).
113. Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1970).
114. See Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
115. 312 U.S. 496, 500-01 (1941).
116. See, e.g., Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 230 (1908).
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has been articulated frequently in abstention cases involving the ne-
cessity of interpretation of state law, it is also found in other areas,
such as habeas corpus petitions by state prisoners. Likewise in con-
sidering the matter of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction, the Court
has had occasion to ascribe to comity the avoidance of needless de-
cisions of state law.117
While comity is frequently honored in opinions, particularly in
general summaries of the law of abstention, the Supreme Court has
not found the possibility of non-comity friction to be an insurmount-
able hurdle. Thus in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda
Co.," s the contention was made that abstention was justified on the
ground of avoiding the hazard of friction in federal-state relations
when a district court was called on to adjudicate a case involving
the state's power of eminent domain. The Court alluded to the fact
that the district court would simply be applying state law in the
same manner as would a state court and held the fact that the case
concerned the state's power of condemnation no more justified ab-
stention than any other issue related to sovereignty. "Surely," ac-
cording to the Court, "eminent domain is no more mystically in-
volved with 'sovereign prerogative' than a State's power to regulate
fishing in its waters.""' 9  The Court in this case relied on various
types of cases which have been historically federally adjudicated
without an apparent breakdown in federal-state relations. Again,
as in the case of most of the factors, if not substantially all, the fed-
eral-state friction possibility seems to be another factor to weigh in
the balancing process.
EXCEPTIONAL OR SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES: The rule has been
stated variously that there must be exceptional or special circumstances
clearly justifying an abstention. 1 20  In Merritt-Chapman & Scott v.
117. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
118. 360 U.S. 185, 191 (1959).
119. Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas' opinion for the unanimous Court in Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82, 87 (1970), in which abstention was approved with regard
to fish resources, an asset unique in its abundance in Alaska.
120. In County of Allegheny v. Masheda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959), the
Court after enunciating the rule, obviously found no such exceptional circumstances
but to the extent, if at all, there were any, they were overridden by factors
calling for no further delay. No effort is made in this article to distinguish County
of Allegheny from Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S.
25 (1969) decided by the same court, the same term.
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Frazier,12 1 the court stated that there were no problems of constitu-
tionality or compelling considerations of policy present which con-
stitute the special circumstances that would require or merit a stay
to enable defendant to secure from the state court a definitive an-
swer to questions presented in a state declaratory action. It is sug-
gested that the mere existence of "problems of constitutionality" is
not a very helpful guideline in arriving at what may be special cir-
cumstances. In Marshall v. Sawyer, it is indicated that abstention
can only be justified "in the exceptional circumstances where the or-
der to the parties to repair to the state court would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest."12
Without specificity in this guideline, it appears that the matter is
placed back squarely on equity principles of weighing and balancing
what may be involved in the particular case. Whether the excep-
tional circumstances are found to exist because of numerous indi-
vidual factors being present or because of the importance of a few
is, of course, a part of the weighing and balancing process. It would
appear something in the nature of judicial fiat may be sometimes in-
volved with this factor, such as the flat statement that there are no
exceptional circumstances in the case before the court which would
justify abstention.' 2  Counsel contending that special circumstances
exist would appear to be well advised to spell them out with specific-
ity. This presumably would impose the duty on the court of show-
ing either that the claimed circumstances were not special or excep-
tional' 24 or that they were overridden by countervailing factors.
The Ninth Circuit cases seem to be particularly addicted to recogni-
tion of the broadly generic, exceptional circumstances or situations
factor although equally prone to finding that such did not exist. 125
Perhaps, upon further analysis, the concept of special or excep-
tional circumstances is not so much a factor in and of itself as it is a
stage upon which other factors may make themselves known. Con-
121. 289 F.2d 849, 854 (9th Cir. 1961).
122. 301 F.2d 639, 645 (9th Cir. 1962).
123. See, e.g., In re Mohammed, 327 F.2d 616, 617 (6th Cir. 1964).
124. Otherwise the wording may be as in Harris v. Palm Springs Alpine Es-
tates, Inc., 329 F.2d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 1964) "rB]ut nothing (in the way of
exceptional situations) has been suggested by either the district court or the appellees
which would justify such action (of abstention) in the present cases."
125. See also Mach-Tranoics, Inc. v. Zirpoli, 316 F.2d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 1963).
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versely, exceptional or special circumstances may be of a type that
may have an application resulting in the exercise rather than in the
nonexercise of jurisdiction. The existence of special circumstances
seems to be indicated as a necessity by the Younger v. Harris'2 6
group of cases, discussed elsewhere, if the federal courts are not to
refrain from exercising jurisdiction in the factual situations involved
in those cases and cases of the Dombrowski type.
NARROW ISSUE: The danger that a federal decision would work a
disruption of an entire legislative scheme of regulation is a factor
which may be involved in abstention cases. 127  Conversely, a nar-
row and specific application of a particular state statute will be
more likely to set the stage for nonabstention. 28 While the narrow
factor here involved is cited for justification of nonabstention, para-
doxically, narrowly limited special circumstances have frequently
been given as the only acceptable criterion for the application of ab-
stention. 129
NEED FOR EXPEDITIOUS HANDLING: The exact phraseology of the
factor here involved was somewhat difficult. It could be termed simply
"Emergency" in some cases, or on a lengthier basis, "The Desirability
That Significant Public Policy Not Be Thwarted Indefinitely." In any
event, the factor was illustrated in Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County.' The litigation involving state school
segregation laws had commenced in 1951 and by 1954 the famous
phrase "all deliberate speed"'' had entered the scene. Ten years
later, the Court, under the circumstances, approved the district
court's refusal to abstain awaiting state court determination of fur-
ther issues. The necessity for quick and effective injunctive relief,
of necessity, could no longer live with the delay of further absti-
126. See, infra note 153. See generally Note, Younger v. Harris: A Current
Appraisal of the Policy Against Federal Court Interference with State Court Proceed-
ings, 21 DEPAUL L. REV. - (1972).
127. See Hostetter v. Idlewild Liquor Corp., 377 U.S 324, 329 (1964).
128. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 140 n.3 (1970).
129. Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967); see also Miller v. Miller,
423 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 1970), and Coleman v. Ginsberg, 428 F.2d 767, 769
(2d Cir. 1970). In the second sense here considered of narrowly limited special
circumstances, we merely have one adjectival variation of the exceptional or special
circumstances factor treated elsewhere herein.
130. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
131. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).
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nence. The time factor entered an apportionment case in another
sense, however, with the Court holding that the district court prop-
erly stayed its hand because of the imminence of elections and, on
remand of the case before it, indicated that the district court could
again exercise its discretion in view of the imminence of the next
election. 112
In a voting rights case, the Court articulated the factor in Harmon
v. Fo 'rssenius, ' in the following language:
In appraising the motion to stay proceedings, the District Court was thus faced with
a claimed impairment of the fundamental civil rights of a broad class of citizens.
The motion was heard about two months prior to the deadline for meeting the statu-
tory requirements and just eight months before the 1964 general elections. Given
the importance and immediacy of the problem, and the delay inherent in referring
questions of state law to state tribunals, it is evident that the District Court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to abstain.
The necessity for expeditious action, however, even in areas of sig-
nificant public policy does not equate with such haste as to result in
the ill-conceived and not properly explored result. 1 4
DELAY IN AND EXPENSE OF LITIGATION: At first blush, this might
seem to be a result rather than a factor of determination. It clearly is
the former but also has a solid impact on the latter. This is so, even
though judicial references to cost and expense may be found in opin-
ions dissenting from the approval of abstention. Excessive expense in
litigation combined with inordinate delay in the administration of
justice are bound in any event to make a persuasive case for re-
form. '5
In United Gas Co. v. Ideal Cement Co.,'"6 the judgment of the
court of appeals was vacated to permit a construction by the state
court of a municipal code, "so far as relevant to this litigation, to be
sought with every expedition in the state courts."'18 7  Mr. Justice
Douglas dissented on the basis that the long-drawn-out litigation
132. Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
133. 380 U.S. 528, 537 (1965).
134. See the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas in Jackson v. Ogilvie,
401 U.S. 904 (1971).
135. See discussion of the matter, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE
DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, Commentary,
Section 1371(e), at 293 (1968).
136. 369 U.S. 134 (1962).
137. Id. at 136.
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was needless. He referred to the financial burden on litigants,
"which can be afforded only by those who take the cost as a tax de-
duction or get reimbursement through increased rates."'138
In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,'39 the Court but-
tressed its action in refusing to order abstention by pointing out that
the respondents had consumed considerable time and expense pur-
suing their claim and that to order them out of the federal court
would accomplish nothing except to require still another lawsuit,
with added delay and expense for all parties. The fact that litiga-
tion had already been long delayed, despite the plaintiff's efforts to
expedite the proceedings, was given consideration in Hostetter v.
Idlewild Liquor Corp.4 '
The Court accepted delay and expense as a factor against absten-
tion in Baggett v. Bullitt,141 being unable to ignore the fact that ab-
stention operates to require piecemeal adjudication in many courts
thereby delaying ultimate adjudication on the merits for an undue
length of time. The Court also referred to the costly result. How-
ever, here the reference was to the figurative expense to citizens of
an inhibition of the exercise of First Amendment freedoms inherent
in the vagueness of a state statute.
Quoting from Public Utilities Commission of Ohio v. United Fuel
Co.,' 42 the Court laid down a salutary rule for the utilization of the
present factor:
Where the disposition of a doubtful question of local law might terminate the entire
controversy and thus make it unnecessary to decide a substantial constitutional ques-
tion, considerations of equity justify a rule of abstention. But where, as here, no
state court ruling on local law could settle the federal questions that necessarily
remain, and where, as here, the litigation has already been in the federal courts an in-
ordinately long time, considerations of equity require that the litigation be brought to
an end as quickly as possible.143
STATE CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS: Judicial decisions have fashioned a
doctrine of abstention, "whereby full play would be allowed the States
in the administration of their criminal justice without prejudice to
138. Id. at 136.
139. 360 U.S. 185, 196 (1959).
140. 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
141. 377 U.S. 360, 378 (1964).
142. 317 U.S. 456, 463 (1943).
143. Baggitt v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 379 (1964).
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federal rights enwoven in the state proceedings . . . . With refine-
ments, this doctrine requiring the exhaustion of state remedies
[in the case of state prisoner habeas corpus proceedings] is now
codified in 28 U.S.C. §2254. ' 144
The present factor, however, deals with the generally recognized
reluctance of federal courts to interfere or intervene in state criminal
proceedings in other than the habeas situations. However, that
the principle, as in most other instances of the area under study, is
not an absolute is demonstrated by Dombrowski v. Pfister.'45 There
the Court, although discussing the historical development of the
principle, contributed to legal lore the now often quoted words
"chilling effect on free expression"'14 6 and did interfere with threat-
ened criminal prosecution on the basis that defense of the prospec-
tive state criminal prosecution would not assure adequate vindica-
tion of constitutional rights. Ultimately, the matter rested on the ir-
reparable injury which would occur if the parties were required to
await the state court's disposition and ultimate review in the Su-
preme Court of any adverse determination. Mr. Justice Harlan,
joined by Mr. Justice Clark, dissented on the basis that the decision
abolished the doctrine of federal abstention in all suits attacking
state criminal statutes for vagueness on First-Fourteenth Amend-
ment grounds.
Subsequent cases seem to indicate that a fair statement of the fac-
tor here under consideration is that it is a recognized policy for the
federal courts to refuse to intervene in state criminal prosecutions
except under extraordinary circumstances. 14 7 It has been stated that
the healthy functioning of the federal system is fostered when the
administration of the state's criminal laws and the determination of
their validity is left in the first instance to the courts of the state. 148
If an eroding door was opened by Dombrowski on the disinclina-
144. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419 (1963).
145. 380 U.S. 479, (1965).
146. 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965).
147. See Tomiyasu v. Golden, 358 F.2d 651, 654 n.2 (9th Cir. 1966). The
word "extraordinary" will, of course, have to be interpreted in the light of the
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), group of cases, discussed hereinafter.
148. Chestnut v. People of the State of New York, 370 F.2d 1, 6 (2d Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967); see also Vigliano v. Thevos, 390 F.2d 55,
56 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 897 (1969).
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tion of the federal courts to intervene in state criminal proceedings,
with possible widening of the passageway in subsequent lower court
decisions, certainly the erosion was not only retarded but clearly nar-
rowed by the pronouncements in the Younger v. Harris cases. 149
The exact boundary lines of the impact will indubitably be the sub-
ject of cases in the federal courts during the next several years. Be-
cause of the position of the writer with respect to litigation in the
federal courts, and because of the developing nature of the present
matter, further comment on the impact will be confined to observa-
tion of some of the cases which are the progeny of the Younger v.
Harris cases.
A dramatic illustration of the impact is found in a Fifth Circuit
case. In .LeFlore v. Robinson,"' a municipal ordinance relating
to demonstrations was the subject of attack. The suit was dis-
missed below and the court of appeals reversed holding that the lim-
iting ordinance was facially invalid. The court did not reach the
issue of whether the anti-injunction statute would preclude an in-
junction against pending municipal proceedings but recognized the
availability of the declaratory relief, despite the tendency of inter-
ference with state proceedings, and anticipated that the municipality
would honor the declaratory determination. The opinion of the
court contains a comprehensive analysis of existing pre-Younger v.
Harris authority.
While the petition for rehearing and for rehearing en banc were
pending before the court, the Supreme Court handed down the
Younger v. Harris cases. Upon rebriefing and further considera-
tion in the light of those cases, the earlier opinion was withdrawn and
the case was remanded to the district court for a full evidentiary
hearing, findings of fact and conclusions of law in the light of the
principles announced in the Younger cases.15 '
In a subsequent case in the same circuit, an action was filed to en-
join enforcement of municipal ordinances. In a per cu iam deci-
sion, the court declared that in view of the fact that neither irrep-
149. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
(1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971);
Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971) and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971).
150. 434 F.2d 933 (5th Cir. 1970).
151. LeFlore v. Robinson, 446 F.2d 715, 716 (5th Cir. 1971).
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arable injury nor bad faith prosecution was present in the case, the
rule laid down in Dombrowski would not be applicable, but on the
contrary the case was controlled by the Younger v. Harris cases.
The district court's judgment that the ordinances were constitutional,
but that they had been unconstitutionally applied, was vacated and
the case was remanded with the directions that it be dismissed.15 2
In Corbett v. Bowman,' 53 a three-judge court noted that the
Younger cases determined as a matter of national policy that the fed-
eral courts should not interfere with pending state criminal prosecu-
tions in the absence of exceptional circumstances. The case before
the court involved juvenile proceedings but the panel saw no reason
for differentiating such a case from the Supreme Court cases. The
court finding no exceptional circumstances in the case to warrant in-
tervention, the case was dismissed.
In Hull v. Petrillo,54 a case involving allegations of harassment
in connection with the distribution of a Black Panther newspaper,
the Second Circuit took cognizance of the recently decided Younger
v. Harris cases but found that they did not require ignoring Dom-
browski. In Hull, there was no pending prosecution sought to be
enjoined. Despite the apparently unsettled reach of Younger, it
would appear that the presence of harassment will be a factor, at
least where First Amendment rights are involved, militating against
abstention. Indeed Mr. Justice Black in the opinion for the Court in
Younger v. Harris commented that Harris had failed to make any
showing, inter alia, of harassment.
Two more recent cases illustrate one of the problems emerging
from the Younger v. Harris cases. This concerns whether or not a
difference exists between the injunctive and the declaratory relief
situations. Facing the question, the First Circuit in Wulp v. Cor-
coran155 asked whether the same rigorous standard of "great and im-
mediate" harm as defined in Younger applies to a case where no
state prosecution is pending but there is every reasonable expectation
that a violation will be criminally prosecuted; that is, asked the court,
must the plaintiff in such a case show bad faith and harassment
152. Thevis v. Moore, 440 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir. 1971).
153. 327 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Wisc. 1971).
154. 439 F.2d 1184 (2d Cir. 1971).
155. 40 U.S.L.W. 2493 (January 11, 1972).
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with injury more than that incidental to any criminal proceeding,
the chilling effect more than that stemming from any vague or over-
broad law regulating expression and more than the minor impact on
speech incidental to a law of regulating conduct? The court con-
cluded that if this is so then there is no room left for the use of the
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in testing state and federal crim-
inal statutes. Reference was made to Mr. Justice Brennan's ex-
tended views in the Perez"' case of the Younger v. Harris groups
but these theories did not prevail in the light of the majority's recog-
nition of a prior pending state prosecution. The Wulp court, how-
ever, felt it could not dismiss the congressional history reviewed by
Mr. Justice Brennan and held that resort was proper to the milder,
less intrusive, and more timely remedy of declaratory judgment to
test criminal laws, both state and federal.
Some of the same issues were considered by the Third Circuit in
Spencer v. Kugler. 5 7 The majority pronouncement of the Supreme
Court in Samuels was noted to the effect that where the relief sought
by declaratory judgment would require a subsequent injunction to
protect or effectuate that judgment, there is, in reality, no practical
reason to differentiate between injunctive and declaratory remedies
because the practical effect of the two remedies is identical-the
disruption of the enforcement by a state of its statute. Because of
other reasons for disposition of the case, the court did not attempt
to resolve this issue. Obviously, of course, some court or courts will
have to attempt to do so. The court's opinion also noted that the
distinction between an injunction and a declaratory judgment action
had been well-delineated in Zwickler v. Koota.5 s
In the background of all of. these cases looms, of course, the anti-
injunction statute itself. Future courts, in the context of that stat-
ute, as well as the Dombrowski and Younger v. Harris cases, will
have to determine what are extraordinary cases, possibly bearing in
mind that they now need to be more extraordinary, and further to
determine to what extent, if any, declaratory relief is permissible
where there is an impact upon state criminal procedures.
156. 401 U.S. 82 (1971).
157. 40 U.S.L.W. 2513 (January 24, 1972).
158. 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
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ANTI-INJUNCTION STATUTE: The anti-injunction statute, 5 ' obvi-
ously a factor in theories or applications of abstention in its broad
sense, is short and seemingly to the point:
A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a
state court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in
aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.
The origin of this statute traces back to part of the Act of March
2, 1793 (C.22, 1 Stat. 333, 334) which contained the brief pro-
vision: "nor shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay pro-
ceedings in any court of a state . . . ." The intervening years found
one exception based upon Section 21 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1867.
Until 1941, however, the effectiveness of the statute was diminished
by restrictive construction and judge-made exceptions. 6 ° In 1941,
the Supreme Court, in Toucey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 6'
reversed the previous trend and revitalized the anti-injunction stat-
ute. The issue before the Court in Toucey was whether a life in-
surance company, after having successfully defended against a claim
in federal court, could seek an injunction to prevent relitigation of
the claim in the state court when it could not remove to the federal
court since the claimant had assigned his claim to avoid diversity.
The question posed was whether the federal courts could use their
injunctive powers, in spite of the statute, "to save the defendants in
the state proceedings the inconvenience of pleading and proving res
judicata."I 62
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the majority, rejected the
view that such a judicially created exception to the anti-injunction
statute was permissible. Indeed, the only judicially created excep-
tion he was willing to recognize was an injunction by a federal court
to prevent a state court from interfering with a res in the custody of
the federal court.
The enactment of the Judicial Code of 1948 apparently rejected
the analysis of Toucey. The Reviser's Note to this section stated:
"Therefore the revised section restores the basic law as generally un-
159. 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
160. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS, at 178 (2d ed. 1970); to the same effect, 1A
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, 10.208[2] at 2302 (1965).
161. 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
162. Id. at 129.
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derstood and interpreted prior to the Toucey decision." Specifically,
the exception was added, "to protect or effectuate its judgment."
However, Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Brothers Co. 6'
construed the revised statute in the Toucey manner. Despite the
absolute language of the Court, exceptions have been found. In
Leiter Minerals, Inc. v. United States, 64 Mr. Justice Frankfurter
writing for a unanimous Court held that the statute did not bar an
injunction against state court proceedings where the United States
sought the injunction.
In this setting, one can read Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers"' as a reaffirmation of Rich-
man Brothers. The Court once again rejected the view that the Act
only establishes a "principle of comity," not a binding rule on the
power of the federal courts. The argument before the Court im-
plied that in certain circumstances the federal court might enjoin
state court proceedings even if that action could not be justified by
any of the three exceptions. 66 In rejecting this argument and lim-
iting federal court injunctions of state court proceedings to the three
statutory exceptions, the Court merely restated its consistent majority
opinion. 1 7
Because of its extended discussion of the anti-injunction statute
as an enactment of the principle of comity, and its application in
First Amendment freedom of speech cases, the pre-Atlantic Coast
Line case of Sheridan v. Garrison"8 is noted. This was a suit
brought by television news reporters to enjoin a criminal prosecution
in the state court on the ground that it was an attempt to harass and
intimidate reporters in violation of their constitutionally protected
rights of free speech. The district court had granted summary judg-
ment in favor of the district attorney. On appeal, the holding of
163. 348 U.S. 511 (1955).
164. 352 U.S. 220 (1957). The Leiter exception was construed to include a fed-
eral agency, N.L.R.B. v. Nash-Finch Co., 40 U.S.L.W. 4037 (Dec. 8, 1971).
165. 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
166. 398 U.S. at 286-287.
167. On this occasion, the only dissenting opinion argued breadth of one of the
statutory exceptions and not any judicially implied loophole. In contrast, in the
Richman Bros. case, supra, 348 U.S. at 521, Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in dis-
senting, argued that § 2283 was intentionally written to contract rather than ex-
pand the impact of the anti-injunction provision.
168. 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
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the court was that the statute was not a bar to injunctive relief in the
federal courts against a state criminal case in which there is adequate
indication that the prosecution is brought in bad faith for the pur-
pose and effect of suppressing free speech in violation of the First
Amendment.
In view of Atlantic Coast Line, the authoritative effect of Sheridan
is questionable although the lengthy analysis is worth the reading.
As might have been expected, particular reliance was placed upon
Dombrowski,a"9 whose principles were extended in the present case.
The court of appeals did emphasize that the decision was in the con-
text of First Amendment rights only and was limited in two other
ways. First, the court noted that the criminal prosecution had "be-
gun" only in a technical sense and that trial proceedings were not
under way. Second, the court considered only the case in which it
appears that if First Amendment rights are in jeopardy, no equally
effective protection can be had for such rights other -than resort to
the federal injunction. Nevertheless, the salvation of the case as au-
thority after Atlantic Coast Line remains in the arguable category.
An auxiliary question is now before the courts as to whether the
Civil Rights Act 170 falls within the exception of the anti-injunction
statute, "as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress." The Su-
preme Court has heard oral argument in a case raising this issue:
Mitchum v. Foster.1 7' The recent case of Lynch v. Household Fi-
nance Corp.,17 ' had raised this problem but the Court did not decide
on this issue. The Court indicated a possible narrowing of the con-
cept of "proceedings in a state court" under the anti-injunction stat-
ute. The Connecticut statutory provisions for garnishment were
held by the majority not to be such proceedings and therefore the
anti-injunction statute was not a bar to an injunction suit.
Another application of the anti-injunction statute is that a federal
suit can not be barred merely because a holding of the case might be
res judicata as to the same parties litigating the same issue in a state
169. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
171. Probable jurisdiction noted, 402 U.S. 941 (1971). Oral argument was heard
on December 13, 1971.
172. 40 U.S.L.W. 4341 (March 23, 1972).
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court. In County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co.,173 upon
the foregoing basis, the Court held that since the statute barred only
injunctions designed to stay state court proceedings, it would not bar
the relief requested in the suit before it, being a suit for ouster, even
though the state court condemnation proceedings might be moot.
STATE'S OWN AFFAIRS: It has been stated in Detroit Edison Co. v.
East China Township School Dist. No. 3174 that federal courts gen-
erally abstain from exercising jurisdiction in order to avoid conflict
with the administration by a state of its own affairs. This is a broad
and sweeping statement which seems to have been only an occasional
basis for abstention. It is no doubt fair to say that some state au-
thorities at least feel that any action in federal court dealing with
state statutes or state procedures conflicts with administration by the
state of its affairs. Obviously, the scope of this factor is not sweep-
ingly broad. 175
The rationale here is that those considerations which have led fed-
eral courts of equity to refuse to enjoin the collection of state taxes,
save in exceptional cases, require a like restraint in the use of the
declaratory judgment procedure. The present factor, to the extent
that it is a valid one and a product of ratiocination rather than ra-
tionalization, is believed to be one which would be aided by the
presence of other factors rather than standing alone as a bald state-
ment of basis. Thus, in Detroit Edison, it was noted that there was
claimed failure to comply with the state law, including the state con-
stitution, and therefore the federal constitutional claims might well
be avoided altogether by the resolution of the local law issues.
In another recent case utilizing the present factor,176 a case in-
volving claims by students that they had been denied registration as
voters in the state in which their college was located, abstention was
173. 360 U.S. 185 (1959).
174. Detroit Edison Co. v. East China Township Sch. Dist. No. 3, 378 F.2d
225 (6th Cir. 1967). The plaintiffs had sought a declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201 (1964) that the annexation of two larger school districts in which they owned
property violated the Fourteenth Amendment and that the assumption of the bonded
indebtedness of the two annexed school districts by the combined district violated
both the federal constitution and state law. The complaint was dismissed by the
district court, affirmed on appeal.
175. Reliance was placed on Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319
U.S. 293 (1943).
176. Harris v. Samuels, 440 F.2d 748, (5th Cir. 1971).
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approved on the basis that "in a matter of such importance to the
State and the Government, federal courts should be slow to inter-
vene but should instead avoid needless conflict with administration
by the State of its own affairs." Again, however, the Court recog-
nized that a federal construction of the state statute might be re-
placed the next day by a controlling state adjudication and that the
federal courts might be proceeding to a premature, and perhaps un-
necessary, constitutional adjudication. It would seem to be possi-
ble to find in these cases a substantial retrenchment from the clear
duty, noted elsewhere herein, of the federal courts to exercise their
jurisdiction when properly invoked despite difficulty of state law de-
termination and the possibility a state court might later disagree.
On the other hand, one can discern elements of avoidance of federal-
state friction. In addition, there may be common strains of identifi-
cation with the Burford-Southern Railway'17 type of abstention.
Clearly, Congress has indicated, as a matter of public policy, cer-
tain areas of freedom to the states in the administration of their own
affairs.' 7
IMPAIRMENT OF STATE FUNCTIONS: The Court observed in Martin
v. Creasy179 that the considerations which support the wisdom of ab-
stention have been so thoroughly and repeatedly discussed by the
Court as to require little elaboration. In addition to the desirability
of avoiding unseemly conflict between two sovereignties and the pre-
mature determination of constitutional questions, the Court indi-
cated that reflected among the concerns which have traditionally
counseled a federal court to stay its hand is the unnecessary impair-
ment of state functions.
In Hostetter v. Idlewild Ban Voyage Liquor Corp.,180 the Court
referred to many cases in which abstention has been held appropriate
where there was danger that a federal decision would work a disrup-
tion of an entire legislative scheme of regulation. Just as the origin
of the "doctrine of abstention" is frequently ascribed to a particular
case, Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,'8' the present type
177. For extended discussion, see infra, notes 186 & 187.
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 and 1342 (1970).
179. 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
180. 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
181. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).
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of abstinence is deemed to stem from Burford v. Sun Oil Co.18 2
STATE ADMINISTRATIVE-REGULATORY PROCEDURE: Although some
aspects of this factor do not fall within the parameters of the classic
Pullman doctrine of abstention,' 83 common elements are found to
run through both areas of non-exercise of jurisdiction. Thus, in two
statutes prohibiting injunctive action by district courts, one dealing
with state taxes and the other so-called Johnson Act, dealing with rate
orders of state agencies, there is in each a proviso that there must be a
plain, speedy and efficient remedy in the courts of the state.
Beyond, however, the statutory interdiction, a body of judicial re-
straint has been developed in the area of complex state administra-
tive-regulatory procedures. The foreshadowing of this development
is no doubt found in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co.l1 4  The
cases, however, generally considered as siring this particular branch
of abstention are Burford v. Sun Oil Co.' 5 and Alabama Public Ser-
vice Commission v. Southern Railway Co.186 In both cases, the Su-
preme Court ordered the federal case dismissed on the ground that it
involved issues of peculiar local interest regarding which the particular
state concerned had established a specialized regulatory system for
both decision and review.
The impact of the Burlord-Southern Railway type of abstention
may be limited but should not be ignored. It was unsuccessfully
urged as authoritative in Holmes v. New York City Housing Au-
thority.187 As the court of appeals there pointed out, "in those cases
the federal courts were asked to resolve problems calling for the
comprehension and analysis of basic matters of state policy . . .
which were complicated by non-legal considerations of a predomi-
nantly local nature . . . which made abstention particularly appro-
priate." Both Burford and Southern Railway, in the opinion of the
court, involved situations to which the federal courts could make
small contribution. Further, the state legislatures in those cases had
specially concentrated all judicial review of administrative orders in
182. 319 U.S. 315, 323 (1943).
183. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 51 at 194 (2d ed. 1970).
184. 211 U.S. 210 (1908).
185. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
186. 341 U.S. 341 (1951).
187. 398 F.2d 262, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1968).
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one state court, in effect designating the state courts and agencies as
"working partners" in a local regulatory scheme.
In a recent three-judge court decision in the Southern District of
New York,18 the court based its decision, in part, on what it
termed a second recommended area for the application of the ab-
stention doctrine which was where the exercise of jurisdiction would
disrupt state administrative processes. It appeared in the case be-
fore the court that the administrative process involved the complex
relationships between the State of New York and the public em-
ployees of that state, in which relationship the court stated it should
not unnecessarily intrude.
Even, however, in this area it can not be safely said that other fac-
tors commonly evaluated in the determination of whether to abstain
or not to abstain may not successfully counterbalance what would
appear to be a Burford-Southern Railway type of case. It is inter-
esting to note in this respect that Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the author
and exponent of the Pullman doctrine of abstention, dissented in
Burford,189 in which dissent he was joined by three other members
of the Court.
POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE: The Kent State University incident
provided the basis for a statement regarding the "Political Ques-
tion Doctrine." The majority of the court in Morgan v. Rhodes9 '
held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint as fail-
ing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The majority's opinion adverted to the political question doctrine
as follows:
The partial dissent in this case relies basically on a form of abstention usually re-
ferred to as the political question doctrine. At the height of its influence in the fed-
eral courts, it caused the courts to abstain from adjudicating many asserted federal
constitutional violations in fields as widely diverse as voting rights and the rights of
prisoners in correctional institutions. The diminished vitality of the political ques-
tion doctrine is specifically illustrated in such voting rights cases as Reynolds v.
Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and in such
prisoner rights cases as Haines v. Kerner, 40 LW 4156 (1972) (Jan. 13, 1972), and
Gonzales v. Rockefeller, 40 LW 2376 (1971) (Dec. 28, 1972).
188. Kiernan v. Lindsay, 40 U.S.L.W. 2328 (Nov. 24, 1971), judg. summarily
affd., 40 U.S.L.W. 3463 (March 24, 1972).
189. 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943).
190. 40 U.S.L.W. 2571 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 1972).
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It is suggested that the above quotation no doubt accurately reflects
the present status of this particular doctrine. Whether changing
political-philosophical concepts of the courts from time to time will
make a change in this area is obviously anyone's guess.
INCIDENTAL FEDERAL QUESTION: While no case has been noted
using the exact phraseology of this factor militating in favor of ab-
stention, such a factor is at least suggested in some of the cases. Thus,
in Hohensee v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways,191 the court
cited the Martin v. Creasy language on full protection of United States
constitutional rights being afforded by the state courts. The court of
appeals summarily affirmed the denial of a claim to recover judg-
ment for land taken under the "Federal-Highway Act"' 2 on the
basis that the claimant had not invoked the aid of any state court
insofar as the record showed.
A suggestion might also be found in those cases which have de-
clined to decide whether a public school may constitutionally refuse
to permit a student to attend solely because his hair style meets with
the disapproval of the school authorities. Incidentally, the Supreme
Court has, as of the time of this writing, itself abstained from passing
on the issue although Mr. Justice Douglas, in dissenting from the
denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari, pointed out recently that
eight circuits had passed on the question with there being an even
division. 19 3
The "long hair" cases are, of course, not abstention cases in the
classic sense. The Supreme Court's abstention involved three con-
solidated cases in which dismissals were affirmed in two of the
cases with a reversal with instructions to dismiss in the third case.
No reason is seen for the retention of jurisdiction nor are these ab-
stention cases in the sense that the claimants are being remitted to
state remedies. Nevertheless, they reflect an interesting aspect in
191. 383 F.2d 784 (3d Cir. 1967).
192. 28 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1966).
193. Freeman v. Flake, 40 U.S.L.W. 3468 (March 27, 1972). The cases cited
are as follows: upholding school regulations--Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th
Cir. 1971); King v. Saddleback Jr. College, 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971); Jackson
v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970); and Ferrell v. Dallas Ind. School District,
392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir. 1968); regulations not upheld-Massie v. Henry, - F.2d
- (4th Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colow, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v.
Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970) and Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th
Cir. 1969).
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the overall analysis of the point at which boundary lines are to be
drawn in the exercise of jurisdiction on claimed federal constitutional
questions.
In essence, incidental (or insignificant) federal questions as a fac-
tor may be only a different way of saying another or other factors.
However, it is clear that the origin of abstention is to be found in
the application of equitable principles.
PRIORITY OF FILING: Assuming a situation in which weight is given
to the existence of actions of similar import and litigants pending in
both federal and state courts, it would appear that some additional
weight should be accorded the continuance of the litigation in the
forum where first instituted.' As is usual throughout the present
area of study, other factors can not be ignored. Thus, in the Apoda-
ca case, the state court had acquired possession of the res, a matter
treated separately in this article, and original jurisdiction in the state
court had not been obtained by "procedural fencing."' 95
RETENTION OF JURISDICTION: While ordinarily not a factor in the
determination of the question of whether to abstain or not to abstain,
the manner of implementation of the decision to abstain is clearly a
factor in the overall picture. In Pullman,'9 6 the Court remanded the
case to the district court "with directions to retain the bill pending
a determination of proceedings, to be brought with reasonable
promptness, in the state court in conformity with this opinion." In
a display of deference to territorial and state courts as the natural
sources for the interpretation and application of the acts of their leg-
islatures, the Supreme Court in Stainback v. Mo Hock Ke Lok Po'9 7
remanded the cause to the district court with directions to dismiss
194. Action filed first in state court: Apodaca v. Carraher, 327 F.2d 713 (10th
Cir. 1964), and Aetna State Bank v. Altheimer, 430 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1970).
Action first brought in federal court: Sayers v. Forsyth Building Corp., 417 F.2d
65, 73 (5th Cir. 1969).
195. Apodaca v. Carraher, 327 F.2d 713 (10th Cir. 1964). It is noted that the
court in Apodaca refers to the priority of filing and the actual possession of res as
ordinarily compelling factors. Quaere as to whether priority is any more than merely
persuasive. Also, as indicated in Apodaca, there are usual undercurrents of comity
which perhaps are stronger where the state court action has been underway before
the federal court action is instituted.
196. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
197. 336 U.S. 368, 383 (1949).
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the complaint."' 8 Without deciding what procedures the district
court should follow on remand, the Supreme Court in Doud v.
Hodge"9' did decide that it was error to dismiss the complaint for
lack of jurisdiction.
In Brown v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply District,200 the court
expressly directed its attention to the question of whether the dis-
trict court should have retained jurisdiction and concluded it should
not have and that the order of dismissal was proper. Yet, interest-
ingly, the court in its opinion adheres to the view of the district court
in its holding "that the questions were of a kind that should be
first submitted to the courts of Mississippi." '' The Supreme Court,
in Reynolds v. Sims, 20 2 while approving the district court's refrain-
ing from acting until the Alabama legislature had been given an op-
portunity to remedy its apportionment scheme, also found propriety
in the district court's retention of jurisdiction in order to give the
provisionally reapportioned legislature an opportunity to act effec-
tively.
What apparently is the present position of the United States Su-
preme Court was forecast by Mr. Justice Harlan in his dissent in
Dombrowski v. Pfister.2"' He advocated abstention but further
stated that the district court should have retained jurisdiction for
the purpose of proffering appellants appropriate relief in the event
the state prosecution did not go forward in a prompt and bona fide
manner.
However, in Tomiyasu v. Golden,20 4 the court stated that the dis-
trict court may either dismiss the action entirely or retain jurisdic-
tion pending litigation in the state court. It pointed out that juris-
diction had been retained where constitutional interests might be
198. Professor Wright discusses the dismissal order of this case on the basis
that it can only be regarded as a sport. WIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 52
at 198 n.19 (2d ed. 1970). It is not clear whether the abstention area is more
subject to this appellation than other areas of the law but it is of interest that
Professor Kurland had also termed another abstention case similarly, KURLA D, Su-
PREME COURT REVIEW 81 (1970).
199. 350 U.S. 485 (1956).
200. 292 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1961).
201. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
202. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
203. 380 U.S. 479, 502 (1965).
204. 358 F.2d 651, 655 (9th Cir. 1966).
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jeopardized, where nonconstitutional federal issues remain to be de-
cided following the intermediate determination of local issues by
the state court, or, finally, where retention is necessary to insure
prompt prosecution of the state court action. The court decided
that no federal interest required retention of jurisdiction in the case
before it. The court did recognize the possibility that new federal
constitutional questions might be raised in the state determination
but seemed to think that ultimate appeal to the Supreme Court from
the state courts was the answer in such event.
In cases arising at about this time, courts of appeals referred to
cases as being the application of the abstention doctrine even though
there had been a dismissal of the action.2 °5 Finally, in Zwickler v.
Koota,20 0 the Supreme Court expressed the opinion that it "is better
practice, in a case raising a federal constitutional or statutory claim,
to retain jurisdiction, rather than to dismiss . . . ." Although there
may be cases which factually indicate that no purpose could be
served by retention of jurisdiction, the Zwickler rule has been fol-
lowed in subsequent cases.20 7  The retention of jurisdiction, of
course, is consonant with the often repeated characterization that ab-
stention does not involve the abdication of federal jurisdiction but
only the postponement of its exercise. 208
RESERVATION OF FEDERAL CONTENTIONS: The mere retention of
jurisdiction would not seem, however, to eliminate a possible pitfall for
the unwary litigant. England v. Medical Examiners209 indicates
that a plaintiff who unreservedly litigates his federal claim in a state
court may lose his right to return to the district court. This, accord-
ing to the Court, would be so whether or not the litigant seeks direct
review of the state decisions in the Supreme Court.2 10
205. Sarfaty v. Nowak, 369 F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1966), and Monogahela Con-
necting R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. U. Comm'n, 373 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1967).
206. 389 U.S. 241, 244 n.4 (1967).
207. See, e.g., Coleman v. Ginsberg, 428 F.2d 767, 770 (2d Cir. 1970), and
Hill v. City of El Paso, 437 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971).
208. See, Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167, 177 (1959); England v. Medical
Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 416 (1964), and Reid v. Board of Education, 453 F.2d
238 (2d Cir. 1971).
209. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
210. ld. at 419.
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In view of Government Employees v. Windsor,21' the Court in
England indicated that the reservation may be accomplished by mak-
ing a state record which informs the state court that the litigant is
exposing his federal claims there only for the purpose of complying
with Windsor and that he intends "should the state courts hold
against him on the question of state law, to return to the District
Court for disposition of his federal contentions." '212 The Court ob-
served, however, that such an explicit reservation is not indispensa-
ble21 and that the litigant is not to be denied his right to return to
the district court unless it clearly appears that he voluntarily did
more than Windsor required and fully litigated his federal claims in
the state court.214
England makes it clear that the right to have ultimate federal de-
termination of the federal issue, assuming no waiver, is not a one
way street. The reservation may be made by any party to the liti-
gation. A plaintiff who unreservedly litigates his federal claims in
the state courts may thereby elect to forego his own right to return
to the federal court, but he cannot impair the corresponding right of
the defendant. The England Court pointed out that the defendant
may in this event protect his right by either declining to oppose the
plaintiff's federal claim in the state court or by opposing it with ap-
propriate reservation. The Court did observe that a refusal to liti-
gate or a reservation by any party may well deter the state court
from deciding the federal question.
FAILURE TO REQUEST ABSTINENCE: Some courts have noted, ap-
parently in passing, the failure of the litigants to request abstention.
The Court in Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Corp.215 accepted the
district court's decision that abstention was unwarranted "where nei-
ther party requested it and where the litigation had already been
long delayed, despite the plaintiff's efforts to expedite the proceed-
ings." In Amsley v. West Virginia Racing Commission," 6 although
211. 353 U.S. 364 (1957).
212. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), at 421.
213. It has been the observation of this writer that where a procedure is indi-
cated as being desirable but not mandatory an abundance of caution is a faithful
ally.
214. England v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), 422 n.13.
215. 377 U.S. 324, 329 (1964).
216. 378 F.2d 815, 818 (4th Cir. 1967).
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the application of the doctrine of abstention was neither suggested
nor urged in the pleadings, briefs or arguments, the Fourth Circuit in-
dicated awareness of the doctrine by way of dictum, examined its ap-
plicability and decided that it would have been inappropriate under
the circumstances present in the case. In Reid v. Board of Education
of the City of New York,217 the Second Circuit stated that it "is no
answer to the contention that the district court should have ab-
stained, that appellants did not raise their state claims in their com-
plaint. Appellants cannot be allowed to frustrate the policies un-
derlying the doctrine of abstention by this simple expedient." '18
The conclusion in this area seems to be that courts will continue
to mention the fact that abstention was not requested but will not
find this as a factor of any real significance.
JUDICIAL ECONOMY: While numerous factors pertaining to whether
there should be abstinence appear in the cases, one which seems
surprisingly underplayed is that of judicial economy. While there
seems to be little argument that the burden on the federal courts is
constantly increasing, despite the creation of new federal judge-
ships, it is doubtful that the worthwhile purpose of achieving judi-
cial manpower conservation should be achieved by abstaining from
the exercise of jurisdiction otherwise proper.
Nevertheless, in a recent case in the Southern District of Texas,210
in what was characterized as a typical secondary school discipline
dispute, the court referred to the rapidly growing field of litigation
which seriously impairs economic judicial administration within the
federal court system. No doubt district judges have subconsciously
entertained such a feeling with regard to the multitude of state pris-
oner habeas corpus petitions, but a conservation of judicial man-
power has not been ordinarily given as a reason for declining relief.
The justification for the recognition of pendent jurisdiction as a
doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right, has been stated by the
Supreme Court to be in part based upon considerations of judicial
economy, both federal and state.220
217. 453 F.2d 238 (2d Cir. 1971).
218. Id. at 242 n.7.
219. Egner v. Texas City Independent School District, 40 U.S.L.W. 2556 (Feb-
ruary 11, 1972).
220. United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
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PREMATURITY: At least one court of appeals has called the resort to
the federal courts premature. In a case launched by an association
of naturopathic physicians challenging California licensing statutes,
the action was dismissed by the district court. Affirming, the court
of appeals noted that there had been no effort made to challenge the
validity of the statutes in the state courts, and, as a matter of fact,
one recent opinion of a California Appellate Court had strengthened
the position of the plaintiff. Under these circumstances, the court
thought that the filing in the district court was premature."2 '
FEDERAL MONEY INVOLVEMENT: In Rosado v. Wyman,222 the
Court stated that while it was no part of the business of the Court to
evaluate, apart from federal constitutional statutory challenge, the mer-
its or wisdom of any welfare programs, whether state or federal, on
the other hand, it is peculiarly a part of the duty of the Court, "no
less in the welfare field than in other areas of the law, to resolve
disputes as to whether federal funds allocated to the States are be-
ing expended in consonance with the conditions that Congress has
attached to their use. ' 221 While the Rosado case involved a matter
of pendent jurisdiction, it is believed that the analogy to the absten-
tion situation is sufficient to justify the inclusion of this matter as a
factor militating against abstention.224
POSSESSION OF THE RES: In the situation in which litigation existed
in both a federal and a state court and was in rem or quasi in rem so
that the court must have possession or control of the res in order to
proceed with the cause and to grant the relief sought, it was es-
221. The National Association of Naturopathic Physicians v. California State
Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 442 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1971).
222. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
223. Id. at 422-23.
224. An interesting variation of the abstention matter suggested by the Rosado
case is abstention in favor of a federal agency as opposed to the state courts in
the ordinary case. When the case was before the court of appeals, that court indi-
cated that the district court should have, at least, declined to act on the pendent
claim until the Department of Health, Education and Welfare had completed its con-
sideration of the relation between the federal statute and state statute. Rosado v.
Wyman, 414 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1969). This contention was rejected by the Su-
preme Court (397 U.S. at 405) because neither principles of exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies nor the doctrine of primary jurisdiction had any application
to the situation before the Court. The Court did state, however, that although
the formal doctrines of administrative law did not preclude federal jurisdiction,
it did not mean that a federal court should deprive itself of the benefit of the
expertise of the federal agency primarily concerned with the problems.
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tablished prior to the Pullman doctrine that the jurisdiction of one
court must of necessity yield to the other court having the res.
This principle is applied in the discharge of the long recognized duty of this court to
give effect to such 'methods of procedure as shall serve to conciliate the distinct and
independent tribunals of the States and of the Union, so that they may cooperate as
harmonious members of a judicial system coextensive with the United States.'22 5
However, the fact that the litigation involved property did not
bring the above rule into play. The rule was contended to be ap-
plicable in County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co. 221 The
contention was made in the context of a condemnation case that the
Board of Viewers had established jurisdiction over the subject land.
The Court's short answer was that the Board of Viewers under
Pennsylvania law did not have in rem jurisdiction over the property
and that the damage proceeding was simply an in personam suit to de-
termine what the state must pay for the property appropriated. On
the other hand, where the state court was in actual possession of the
res and litigation had been first initiated in the state court, both rea-
sons were found compelling by the Tenth Circuit for the federal
court to refrain from entertaining jurisdiction.127
CHOICE OF FORUM: This factor, which seems to be adverted to
most frequently in diversity cases, is couched in terms of Congress
having authorized plaintiffs to choose a federal forum to try their suits
if there is diversity of citizenship and, of course, if the requisite juris-
dictional amount is involved. Principally, it has been stated, this is
to allow suitors to avoid local prejudice.228
As might be expected, the flat statement regarding choice of fo-
rum is tempered in other cases. In a case involving suit by a fed-
eral agency, it was stated that unless "there is an explicit exception
to the duty of a federal court to hear a case to which Congress has
extended its jurisdiction, that duty may not be disregarded." The
court then stated that the only possible exception in the case before
225. United States v. Bank of New York Co., 296 U.S. 463, 477-78 (1936).
226. 360 U.S. 185, 197 (1959).
227. Apodaca v. Carraher, 327 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir. 1964). The general
rules here applicable are discussed in Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145, 146 (10th
Cir. 1970), although in that case neither court had taken possession of the prop-
erty,
228. Middle Atlantic Utilities Co. v. S.M.W Development Corp., 392 F.2d 380,
385 (2d Cir. 1968).
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it was that which allows abstention.22 But the abstention doctrine
as an exception is to be applied only in narrowly limited circum-
stances.28 0
FORUM NON CONVENIENS: This factor, as stated in Hoffman v. Go-
berman,23 ' recognizes that while a litigant does not have an absolute
right under all circumstances to maintain his suit in a federal court,
his election of such a forum otherwise proper should not be disre-
garded in the absence of persuasive evidence that the retention of
jurisdiction will result in manifest injustice to the defendant.
A type of abstention is involved in the relationship of one dis-
trict court to another district court. The Hoffman court held that
A district court may in the interest of justice decline to pass upon the merits of a con-
troversy and relegate the plaintiff to a more appropriate forum. . . . However, when
the doctrine of forum nons conveniens is invoked on a motion to dismiss, 'it is sub-
ject to careful limitation and applied only in exceptional cases and unless the bal-
ance is strongly in favor of the defendant the forum chosen by the plaintiff should
not be disturbed.' 23
2
EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES: Occasionally, apparently aberrant refer-
ences to exhaustion of remedies are found in the cases dealing with
abstention in the narrower or quasi-Pullman sense. Thus, in Ams-
ley v. West Virginia Racing Commission,233 the district court, con-
sidering only lack of exhaustion of remedies, granted the defendant's
motion to dismiss. The court of appeals, noting that the Commis-
sion's action with regard to the plaintiff was the exercise of a judi-
cial function, held that there is no requirement that a person ag-
grieved by a decision of a state administrative agency performing a
judicial function must first apply for relief in the courts of that
state. "On the contrary, it is well settled that resort to a federal
court may be had without first exhausting the judicial remedies of
state courts. '23.  The court of appeals, by way of dictum, consid-
ered the possible application of the doctrine of abstention and found
it inapplicable.235
229. Federal Savings & Loan Corp. v. Krueger, 435 F.2d 633, 637 (7th Cir.
1970).
230. Moreno v. Henckel, 431 F.2d 1299, 1307 (5th Cir. 1970).
231. 420 F.2d 423, 428 (3d Cir. 1970).
232. Id. at 426. See also Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947).
233. 378 F.2d 815 (4th Cir. 1967).
234. Id. at 817.
235. Id. at 818.
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In Damico v. California,' 6 plaintiffs challenged certain provisions
of the California Welfare and Institutions Code on the grounds that
the statute and regulation were discriminatory and that the state in ad-
ministering them had also deprived plaintiffs of their equal rights.
A three-judge district court dismissed the complaint solely because
it appeared that "all of the plaintiffs [had] failed to exhaust ade-
quate administrative remedies. '23 7  The Court in a per curiam de-
cision summarily reversed on the basis that the Civil Rights Act
sought to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplemental to
any the state might provide and that relief under the Civil Rights
Act may not be refused because relief is not first sought under state
law which provides an administrative remedy.
A distinction was drawn in Moreno v. Hencke238 between exhaus-
tion of state administrative remedies as opposed to state judicial
remedies 3 ' although the cases cited in the opinion clearly hold that
in Civil Rights Act cases there is no necessity for exhausting ade-
quate state administrative remedies. In any event, the district
court had dismissed the complaint on the assumption of a necessary
relationship between exhaustion of state judicial remedies and the
abstention doctrine. The court of appeals here drew another dis-
tinction, stating that exhaustion of state remedies as a prerequisite
to considering a case on the merits is a jurisdictional or a pseudo-
jurisdictional requirement, while the abstention doctrine assumes
that the court has jurisdiction. Thus, there is no general rule for-
bidding the court to act absent exhaustion of state judicial remedies.
It would seem, however, even in the correctly-called exhaustion
cases, that the courts are dealing with, at most, a pseudo-jurisdic-
tional requirement. It would appear that the exhaustion doctrine is
not jurisdictional in the technical sense of that term and that the
district court has jurisdiction which under the statute it does not ex-
ercise. 4 ° What has been dealt with under this topic, of course, has
no application to abstention in the broader conceptual sense such as
236. 389 U.S. 416 (1967).
237. Id. at 417.
238. 431 F.2d 1299 (5th Cir. 1970).
239. "There are good reasons in favor of requiring exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies which are not applicable to exhaustion of state judicial remedies."
Id. at 1306-07.
240. Baldwin v. Lewis, 442 F.2d 29, 35 (7th Cir. 1971).
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that involved in state prisoner habeas corpus proceedings or, in all
probability, in other statutory types of proceedings requiring ex-
haustion of remedies before the exercise of district court jurisdiction.
At this point, it is appropriate to note what appears to be a tight-
ening of adherence to the requirements of exhaustion of remedies
as indicated by some recent cases. For example, in Picard v. Con-
nor24' it was held that the substance of a state prisoner's habeas
corpus claim must, in the first instance, be fairly presented to the
state courts. It was immaterial that the respondent had presented
all the facts, as the state court had not had a fair opportunity to con-
sider the equal protection claim nor to correct this asserted constitu-
tional defect in the respondent's conviction. "The claim that an
indictment is invalid," stated the Court, "is not the substantial equiv-
alent of a claim that it results in an unconstitutional discrimia-
tion. "242
Recognizing that exhaustion of remedies qua habeas and similar
situations in confrontation with remission to state remedies qua ab-
stention may be a resultant tweedledum and tweedledee, the law
will perhaps be less disturbed if the distinction between them is not
referred to as an interesting semantical exercise. Rather, the bound-
aries separating them should be maintained, and that is where the
matter will be left herein.
CLARITY OF DISTRICT COURT ORDER: Generally, the factors under
consideration have been those which have led to the determination of
the applicability of or necessity for abstention. After the decision
to apply the abstention doctrine has been reached the form of the
abstention order becomes important.
The form of the order in the event of favorable or unfavorable
action may have an impact upon appealability. Further, a signifi-
cant problem is that which was involved in England v. Medical Ex-
aminers243 as to whether a litigant who has gone to the state court
has stayed there to the extent of litigating to a conclusion his federal
claims. As was pointed out in England, the district court's abstention
order, "in instructing appellants to obtain a state court determina-
241. 404 U.S. 270 (1971).
242. Id. at 278. See also United States ex rel. Wilson v. Rowe, 454 F.2d 585
(7th Cir. Dec. 2, 1971).
243. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
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tion not of the state question alone but of 'the issues here presented,'
was also misleading." '244
In Williams v. Murdoch,24' difficulty was occasioned by the fact
that the court of appeals could not ascertain clearly whether the dis-
trict court was attempting to apply the abstention doctrine or to re-
mand the case to the state court or to do both. The order being
at best ambiguous, the court could not treat the district court order
as an exercise of abstention. As a result, the orders of the court
below were vacated and the cause remanded for further proceed-
ings (of clarification, delay and expense). In Detroit Edison Co. v.
East China Township School Dist. No. 3,246 the district court order
was criticized in that it was grounded on inconsistent alternative
holdings, one reaching the merits and the other sustaining absten-
tion. It was pointed out that the district court should not have
reached the merits where abstention was proper. As a decision
based on such alternative holdings, the decision needlessly de-
cides a constitutional issue and is in the nature of an advisory
opinion. Over and above being the creator of confusion, the breadth
of the decision might be subject to scrutiny in the state courts in the
form of the defense of res judicata.
PENDENT JURISDICTION: Pendent jurisdiction is ordinarily not con-
sidered a factor in determining abstention. However, in a broader
sense, it, itself, involves a type of abstention or nonabstention to
which a number of the factors herein discussed are applicable.
When exercised, it may involve state law questions; it is a matter of
discretionary use of power and its justification lies in considerations
of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. Comity
matters between the state and federal systems are also involved.247
A.H. Emery Co. v. Marcan Products Corp.24 reflects the fact
that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction may be influenced by the
fact that abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction would
be unwise at "this late date." The court, it was felt, should not tell
244. Id. at 422 n.14.
245. 350 F.2d 840, 842 (3d Cir. 1965).
246. 378 F.2d 225 (6th Cir. 1967).
247. This subject is discussed at length in United Mineworkers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
248. 389 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
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the parties to litigate the matter anew in the state court. The dis-
trict court was found not to have abused its discretion.
A further liberalization of the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is
found in Rosado v. Wyman, 241 in which the Court was not willing
to defeat the common sense policy of pendent jurisdiction by a too
rigid conceptual approach.2 50
SAME LITIGATION IN TWO OR MORE FEDERAL COURTS: Although
probably beyond the already extended scope of this article, an interest-
ing situation by way of analogy, justifying at least passing reference
herein, exists in the case of duplicating litigation in two or more fed-
eral courts. There appears to be no rigid or inflexible rule for deter-
mining priority of cases in such event but wise judicial administration,
giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation does not counsel rigid mechanical solution to
such problems.251 Perhaps the application of factors demonstrated
in this article might in some instances be helpful.
SUPREME COURT ABSTENTION: As has been developed elsewhere
herein, it has been indicated that the difficulty of resolution of state
legal questions is not per se a basis for declining existing jurisdiction.
That this difficulty may nevertheless be entitled to weight is re-
flected in a case involving, original jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court. 512  The State of Ohio had sought leave to file a bill invoking
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction against the defendant com-
panies, incorporated in Michigan, Delaware and Canada, to abate
an alleged nuisance resulting in the contamination and pollution of
Lake Erie from the dumping of mercury into its tributaries. Al-
though admitting that it did have jurisdiction to hear the case, the
Court declined to exercise its jurisdiction since (1) the issues were
bottomed on local law that the Ohio courts were competent to con-
sider; (2) several national and international bodies had been ac-
tively concerned with the pollution problems involved; and (3) the
nature of the case required the resolution of complex, novel, and
249. 397 U.S. 397 (1970).
250. See also Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), and Annotation,
Modern Status of Rules as Pendent Federal Jurisdiction Over Non-Federal Claims,
5 A.L.R. 3d 1040 (1966).
251. Florida v. United States, 285 F.2d 596, 604 (8th Cir. 1960).
252. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemical Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
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technical factual questions that do not implicate important problems
of federal law, which are the primary responsibility of the Court
(and which sometimes have troubled the Court greatly in prior at-
tempts at original jurisdiction). The Court applied a twofold test:
(1) declination of jurisdiction would not disserve any of the principal policies
underlying the Article III jurisdictional grant and (2) the reasons of practical
wisdom that persuade us that this Court is an inappropriate forum are con-
sistent with the proposition that our discretion is legitimated by its use to keep
this aspect of the Court's functions attuned to its other responsibilities. Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas dissented with primary emphasis on the transcending public importance
of the case. 2 53
At the time this article was under final preparation, the news
media 25 4 carried an article indicating that approximately one year
after the Ohio decision, action had been instituted in the Cuyahoga
County Common Pleas Court of Ohio. The news article indicated
that the Ohio suit was a broader version of the earlier suit, indicative
perhaps that the time lost by nonexercise of jurisdiction in one court
may not be a total loss (at least from the plaintiff's viewpoint) if
it results in further research and an improvement of the basic law-
suit.
ACT OF STATE: The expropriation by Cuba of an American corpo-
ration's sugar was the basis for an elaboration on the scope of the act
of state doctrine, the litigation pertaining to which will provide an
evening of interesting legal reading.2 55 The Second Circuit noted
that the act of state doctrine had been recognized and applied by it
and other courts, stemming from the desire of the judiciary to avoid
possible conflict with or embarrassment to the executive and legis-
lative branches of our government in its dealings with foreign na-
tions. This attitude was coupled with a positivistic concept of ter-
ritorial sovereignty and fear of hampering international trade by
rendering titles insecure. Nevertheless, the court found that the
Cuban decree of expropriation was in violation of international law
and refused to find an applicable basis for nonexercise of jurisdic-
tion in the act of state doctrine. The Supreme Court disagreed and
reversed.
253. Id. at 499.
254. Chicago Sun-Times, March 23, 1972 at 76.
255. Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962) re-
versed, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
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Congress disagreed with this particular form of abstention and
passed the Hickenlooper Amendment, sometimes referred to as the
Sabbatino Amendment.256 The American corporation ultimately
prevailed on the basis that the Hickenlooper Amendment required
that the legality of the expropriation be decided on the merits, using
applicable principles of international law, unless the executive
branch intervened. The litigation, interesting though it may be to
read, is of primary concern here only in that the act of state doctrine
is a continuing viable basis for nonexercise of jurisdiction in ordi-
nary cases involving acts of foreign states.
While thoughts are many and varied on this particular item, it is
appropriate to note the holding in Hoffman v. Goberman.25 7  The
court recognized that while it has been held that a court will not ex-
ercise jurisdiction to regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corpo-
ration, there is no absolute rule of law which requires dismissal of an
action on a mere showing that the trial will involve issues which re-
late to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The court not-
ed that the foreign aspect was only one factor to be considered along
with the convenience of the parties and witnesses. The desirability
of trial in a forum familiar with the law of the corporation's domi-
cile and the enforceability of the remedy, if granted, may be analogized
to the difficulty of ascertaining state law in the ordinary situation
of diversity litigation. The court found there was not sufficient
ground for a federal court to decline to exercise its jurisdiction to
decide a case properly before it.
STAY OF CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE COURT: The thrust of the
present article, of course, is entirely on the matter of abstention at the
federal level. The other side of the coin, i.e., stay of civil proceedings
in a state court pending determination of action in the federal court
in the same state, is the subject of an annotation. 25 1
CASE-BY-CASE ANALYSIS: The ascertainment of the existence of the
circumstances requisite to, if not calling for, the application of the
abstention doctrine must be made on a case-by-case basis." 9  In
256. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 171 n.5 (1967).
257. 420 F.2d 423, 427 (3d Cir. 1970).
258. Annotation, Stay of civil proceedings pending determination of action in
federal court in same state. 56 A.L.R. 2d 335 (1957).
259. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964); Hill v. City of El Paso,
Texas, 437 F.2d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 1971).
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looking at each case, the facts and circumstances must be carefully
examined to see if the countervailing interests are, on balance, more
important to the federal constitutional system than a litigant's right
to a federal forum.2 60
MISCELLANY: In an extremely broad meaning of the term absten-
tion, any court action which is dispositive of a case without the merits
being reached could be considered a situation of abstention. Thus,
dismissal of an appeal for failure to comply with rules of court could
be so considered. The scope of the analysis of this subject is far too
broad for the intended scope of this article. The matter, however,
was brought to the attention of the writer by an order of the Su-
preme Court.2" 1 In that case, the appeal was dismissed for failure
to docket the case within the time prescribed. Mr. Justice Douglas
dissented, pointing out past uneven applications of the Rule. He
concluded, "I cannot acquiesce in an arbitrary practice which per-
mits the Court to sweep unpleasant cases under the rug." This ap-
pears to be a salutary admonition in any area of abstention. The
fact that a case is unpleasant should not be the basis for avoidance
whether achieved by arbitrary or by non-arbitrary practice.
The approach that has been used in this article has been that of
considering various factors articulated by the courts. Possibly a
factor which was not developed related to the type of case which the
court may have before it. Certainly of interest on this subject is an
analysis, which time and space does not permit herein, of whether cer-
tain types of cases are more likely to be the basis of abstention or the
basis of abstention for denial. Clearly, in the growing area of civil
rights litigation in the federal courts, it can. As correctly stated in
Wright v. McMann,262 "it is reasonable to conclude that cases involv-
ing vital questions of civil rights are the least likely candidates for
abstention." Where other types of cases may fall will be dependent
to a considerable extent upon a current analysis of the public weal
significance.
The duty of the federal court, at least in the area of civil rights, 26A3
260. Garvin v. Rosenau, - F.2d -, 40 U.S.L.W. 2536 (6th Cir. Feb. 7,
1972).
261. State Board of Election Comrs. v. Evers, 40 U.S.L.W. 3466 (March 27,
1972).
262. 387 F.2d 519, 525 (2d Cir. 1967).
263. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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has been clearly set forth in an often quoted statement of Mr. Jus-
tice Douglas in McNeese v. Board of Education:21 4
We would defeat those purposes [of the Civil Rights Act] if we held that assertion
of a federal claim in a federal court must await an attempt to vindicate the same
claim in a state court. The First Congress created federal courts as the chief-
though not always the exclusive-tribunals for enforcement of federal rights.
While, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, primary reli-
ance has been placed on appellate court cases, a tabulation of dis-
trict court opinions in this area does reveal some interesting infor-
mation. Of 225 cases reviewed in which the courts dealt with the
abstention issue in its opinion, the court abstained in 102, or ap-
proximately 45%. Of the 123 cases in which the court rejected a
request by one party that it abstain, 26 specifically mentioned the
"chilling" of First Amendment rights as a prime consideration; 24
that no possible construction of the state law could avoid the federal
constitutional question; 19 that the statute or issue of state law was
clear on its face; 12 that the state court had previously construed the
statute and thus there was no unclear question of state law.26  Sig-
nificantly, in 26 of the cases in which the court did not abstain, the
ruling on the merits was for the defendant who had raised the ab-
stention issue. Thus, the issue of abstention in those cases rarely
received appellate review since the party seeking it won on the mer-
its below.
Of the cases in which the district courts did abstain, by far the
most frequent specific reason given was to avoid having to rule on
a federal constitutional question when an authoritative decision on
a question of state law would eliminate or substantially modify the
federal question (34 cases). In 17 cases, the district courts specifi-
cally mentioned the availability of a state remedy, either administra-
tive or judicial, as grounds for abstaining; 15 cases noted that the
state courts were already handling the problem properly. Finally,
18 cases specifically opted for allowing a state court the first oppor-
tunity to construe a state statute. Most striking of all was the num-
ber of cases which did not fit into any clear pattern or based a de-
cision on some of the less frequently articulated factors noted in
the foregoing article.
264. 373 U.S. 668, 672 (1963).
265. As might have been expected, numerous cases reflect a decision based on
more than one factor for refusing to abstain.
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As this article heads toward the printer, the news media present
one more possible area of quasi-abstention, namely, the suggestion
of statutorily imposed deprivation of jurisdiction in the so-called
busing cases.20 6  The suggestion is that under Article III of the
Constitution, Congress is granted the right to make "such excep-
tions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction as it sees fit.
No further comment will be made on the present matter than that
a serious question might be posed as to whether legislation which it-
self constituted a constitutional invasion could be precluded from
judicial review as to the constitutional issue.267
CONCLUSION
The conclusion to be drawn from a compilation of the abstention
factors would seem to be surprisingly clear and certain-hindsight
is a valuable judicial attribute when determining whether or not to
refrain from the exercise of jurisdiction. Lacking that, it appears
that a careful analysis must be made of the particular case at hand
in the light of the factors that have been found persuasive in that
type of case at the juncture then involved. Since the pulls may be
both ways, the sensitive process of balancing must then be -utilized.
It is to be hoped that with the ever-increasing case loads of all
courts, greater latitude than has sometimes seemed to exist will be
accorded the result which has flowed from what is obviously a well
reasoned exercise of discretion. Discretion should not be a Hob-
son's choice.
Optimistically, neither the balancing judges, nor the writer of this
article, will have to echo Terence's words, Hoc Pretium ob stultitiam
fero. 268
266. Chicago Sun-Times, April 2, 1972, at 6.
267. Cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 301
(1943).
268. The foregoing article was completed in April 1972. With the hope that
no obsolescence of major proportions has set in, the article will stand as of May 1,
1972, except as to the following matters which have come, unsought, to the
writer's attention.
(a) Mitchum v. Foster (see footnote 171), supra, 40 U.S.L.W. 4737 (U.S. June
19, 1972), held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 falls within the exception of the federal anti-
injunction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, "as expressly authorized by Act of Congress."
(b) The writer had looked with favor upon a process of balancing the various pro




MR. CHIEF JUSTICE STONE IN
MEREDITH v. WINTER HAVEN,
320 U.S. 228, 234-36 (1943)
"In the absence of some recognized public policy or defined principle
guiding the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred, which would in excep-
tional cases warrant its non-exercise, it has from the first been deemed to
be the duty of the federal courts, if their jurisdiction is properly invoked,
to decide questions of state law whenever necessary to the rendition of a
judgment. Commonwealth Trust Co. v. Bradford, 297 U.S. 613, 618;
Risty v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 270 U.S. 378, 387; Kline v. Burke
Construction Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234-235; McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S.
268, 281-282. When such exceptional circumstances are not present,
denial of that opportunity by the federal courts merely because the an-
swers to the questions of state law are difficult or uncertain or have not
yet been given by the highest court of the state, would thwart the purpose
of the jurisdictional act.
"The exceptions relate to the discretionary powers of courts of equity.
An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is
an appeal to the sound discretion which guides the determinations of
courts of equity. Beal v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 312 U.S. 45, 50. Exer-
cise of that discretion by those, as well as by other courts having equity
powers, may require them to withhold their relief in furtherance of a recog-
nized, defined public policy. Di Giovanni v. Camden Insurance Assn.,
296 U.S. 64, 73, and cases cited. It is for this reason that a federal court
having jurisdiction of the cause may decline to interfere with state crim-
Carriers' Assn. v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972), might seem to cast some
doubt on the per se value of balancing. In Lake Carriers, the Court was reviewing
a case in which a three-judge court had abstained on various specified grounds (or
factors). The Supreme Court concluded that "abstention was not proper on the
majority of the grounds given by the District Court," but held that abstention was,
nevertheless, appropriate for another reason suggested, but not fully articulated, in
the lower court opinion. The factor carrying the day was that the state statute was
susceptible to a construction by the state courts that would avoid or modify the
federal constitutional question.
It can scarely be said that the balancing scales were tipped by the factor-at
least in the ordinary use of that term-as no weight whatsoever was apparently
given to the other factors enumerated by the district court. Nevertheless, the fact
remains that the careful marshalling of all of the factors required for a proper
balancing process will likely produce the factor or factors to sustain the result
reached, even if some of the factors are ultimately on appeal found to be alien to
the scale.
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inal prosecutions except when moved by most urgent considerations,
Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95; Beal v. Missouri Pacific
R. Co., supra, 49-51; Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157; or with the
collection of state taxes or with the fiscal affairs of the state, Matthews v.
Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521; Stratton v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 284
U.S. 530; Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293;
or with the state administrative function of prescribing the local rates of
public utilities, Central Kentucky Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission, 290
U.S. 264, 271 et seq. and cases cited; or to interfere, by appointing a re-
ceiver, with the liquidation of an insolvent state bank by a state adminis-
trative officer, where there is no contention that the interests of creditors
and stockholders will not be adequately protected, Pennsylvania v. Wil-
liams, 294 U.S. 176; Gordon v. Ominsky, 294 U.S. 186; Gordon v. Wash-
ington, 295 U.S. 30; cf. Kelleam v. Maryland Casualty Co., 312 U.S.
377, 381. Similarly it may refuse to appraise or shape domestic policy
of the state governing its administrative agencies. Railroad Commission
v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319
U.S. 315. And it may of course decline to exercise the equity jurisdiction
conferred on it as a federal court when the plaintiff fails to establish a
cause of action. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453; Gilchrist v. Inter-
borough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U.S. 159. So too a federal court, ad-
hering to the salutary policy of refraining from the unnecessary decision
of constitutional questions, may stay proceedings before it, to enable the
parties to litigate first in the state courts questions of state law, decision
of which is preliminary to, and may render unnecessary, decision of the
constitutional questions presented. Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,
312 U.S. 496; cf. Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478.
It is the court's duty to do so when a suit is pending in the state courts,
where the state questions can be conveniently and authoritatively an-
swered, at least where the parties to the federal court action are not
strangers to the state action. Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U.S. 168.
In thus declining to exercise their jurisdiction to enforce rights arising
under state laws, federal courts are following the same principles which
traditionally have moved them, because of like considerations of policy, to
refuse to give an extraordinary remedy for the protection of federal rights.
United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352, 359-361; see
Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Federation, 300 U.S. 515, 551-552 and cases
cited; cf. Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. United States Realty Co., 310
U.S. 434, 455 et seq."
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